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me learn about feminism. Lastly, my thanks to my husband, Stephen H. Cooper, who listened to 
every idea, read, thought about, and edited every word more than once, and gave me his time and 
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The term "re-vision," as used in the title of this essay, is derived from FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES: PHILOSOPHICAL EssAYS ON METHOD AND MORALS (L. Code, s. Mullet & c. Overall 
eds. 1988) [hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES]. In the introduction to that work, re-vision is 
defined as "a painstaking scrutiny and explication of the reasons for the hegemony of certain 
theoretical principles, and an exploration of how structures of thought and action might be trans-
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INTRODUCTION 
A. Thinking About Images 
Robert Braithwaite Martineau's portrait of a Victorian family in 
debt, The Last Day in the Old Home, is striking. 1 The matriarch is 
weeping as she hands the auctioneer the keys to the family home. In 
contrast, her roguish son, whose own gambling excesses most likely 
were the cause of the family's misfortune,2 appears unfazed by the fi-
nancial debacle going on around him. With his arm raised and drink 
in hand, he seems smugly optimistic about his future. Her grandson, 
while still radiating youthful innocence, adopts his father's cavalier 
pose and, with drink in hand, gazes out the window with the sense of 
one who anticipates a future filled with opportunity. The rogue's wife, 
slumped between her husband and mother-in-law, looks weary and 
uncertain as to what will happen to her and her family. She reaches 
out to her husband but fails to touch him, physically or emotionally. 
Their young daughter, nestled between her mother and grandmother, 
seems traumatized and clutches her doll as if afraid that it too will be 
taken with the family's other possessions. 
One cannot tell from the painting alone whether Martineau was 
depicting a real-life debtor family in the Victorian era or, assuming its 
historical accuracy, whether the picture is representative of Victorian 
debtor families generally.3 At a minimum, however, tlie painting re-
flects a symbolic reality for one individual, the artist, and it may repr~­
sent broadly shared societal perceptions or even a quantifiable 
depiction of reality.4 
formed if they were considered from a radically different perspective." Id. at 3. The authors 
suggest that the term re-vision was introduced into the lexicon of feminist jurisprudence by Ad-
rienne Rich in A. RICH, When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-vision, in ON LIES, SECRETs, 
AND SILENCE (1979). FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 10 n.1. Rich's characterization of the 
term is equally descriptive of a leading purpose of this essay. For, as she states, "Re-vision - the 
act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction 
-is for women ... an act of survival." A. RICH, supra, at 35;see also Scheppele, The Re-Vision 
of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1095 (1987). 
1. The use of pictorial imagery in this essay was inspired by several sources, most promi-
nently B. WEISS, THE HELL OF THE ENGLISH: BANKRUPTCY AND THE VICTORIAN NOVEL 
(1986). Ms. Weiss' book includes the Martineau painting as well as a brief description of it, and 
she places the painting in the larger context of the Victorian treatment of debtors in the arts. I 
was also influenced by Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987), and Res-
nik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations of Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1877 (1988). In the latter work, the visual imagery used to depict the anthropomorphication of 
Justice serves to underscore the inherent difficulties in defining justice from a purely theoretical 
perspective. See also Werner, Dis-Covering Our Cover, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1989). In 
the context of As We Forgive Our Debtors, visual imagery is a way of humanizing empirical data, 
enhancing factually rich but emotionally barren data. 
2. Examples ofhorseracing, the apparent cause of the family's demise, are visible everywhere 
in the Martineau painting. See B. WEISS, supra note l, at 51.. 
3. Barbara Weiss suggests that the Martineau painting, like the Victorian novels she dis-
cusses in her book, has some historical accuracy. See generally B. WEISS, supra note 1. 
4. The reality of the painting may be a reified image of what an individual believes. See F. 
NIETZSCHE, On Truth a11d Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
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The risk of confusing perception with reality has been of particular 
interest to feminist scholars. Simone de Beauvoir suggests that the 
male's mythical perceptions of the ideal woman do not comport with 
real women. 5 Although one might expect that men would change 
their idealizations to mirror reality, de Beauvoir's point, in the femi-
nist context, is that the opposite occurs. She states: "If the definition 
provided for this concept is contradicted by the behavior of flesh-and-
blood women, it is the latter who are wrong: we are not told that 
Femininity is a false entity, but that the women concerned are not 
feminine."6 
In the bankruptcy context, if we treat our images as correct and 
"reality" as wrong, then the treatment of individual debtors by the 
bankruptcy laws will be based on what we believe debtors should be, 
not what they really are. A bankruptcy system formulated primarily, 
if not solely, on myths - whether on the part of only a few or of 
society as a whole - can produce distortions. If these myths conflict 
with reality, then we must reconsider the system produced by myths. 
But, the issue is more complex than that. Even if we were to decide to 
eliminate stereotypes, how are we to determine what debtors are "re-
ally" like? To the extent we look only to objective as distinguished 
from perspectival data, we again may produce distortions. 
It does not necessarily follow that we would want a legal system 
based solely on some quantifiable depiction of reality as opposed to our 
perceptions of reality or our ideals. Indeed, it may be preferable to 
design a system on the basis of a subjective or idealized understanding. 
We may prefer our mythical image over either a subjective or objective 
reality and would prefer to push debtors toward this image rather than 
adapt the law to their reality. But that conclusion presupposes that we 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER EssAYS (0. Levy ed. & M. 
Miigge trans. 1964). Indeed, there may be no such thing as an "objective" reality. Since every-
one has his/her own images, there is no single and pure "objective" reality; there are only indi-
vidual realities. However, there may be ways of describing more objectivity-enhancing realities. 
See also c. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING (1923). 
For a discussion of the distinction between perception and reality in the bankruptcy context, 
see Perception and Reality: American Bankruptcy Institute Survey on Selected Provisions of the 
1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code (ABI 1987), reprinted in The American Bankruptcy 
Institute Survey: Hearings on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1863 & S. 2279 Before the Subcomm. on Courts 
and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 OOth Cong., 2d Sess. 79-218 
(1988) (hereinafter Perception and Reality]; LoPucki, Tlte Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice, 
63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289 (1989). 
The role myths play in the formation of legal doctrine has been probed in substantive areas 
other than bankruptcy. See, e.g., Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman, 5 LAW & 
INEQUALITY 33 (1987) (discussing the tort of seduction). While I disagree with some of Profes-
sor Sinclair's conclusions regarding the changing myth of the ideal woman, his suggestion that 
we respond to ideals rather than reality is compelling. Id. at 98-99. As he states, "It is not social 
reality that legislatures and courts respond to, but social ideals. The prevailing myth, not the 
prevailing fact, is the motor of change." Id. at 98. 
5. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 237-47 (1952). 
6. Id. at 237. 
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know who debtors really are.7 Determining preferences suggests that, 
at least in the first instance, we can distinguish between image and 
reality. It assumes that we have access to objective and perspectival 
data. Only then can there be a meaningful comparison. 
Looking at The Last Day in the Old Home makes one wonder what 
would be depicted in a painting of a debtor family in 1990 America. 
Would the family group, or its individual members, bear any similarity 
to the images depicted by Martineau? Would such a painting reflect 
only what the artist imagines individual debtors to be - creating a 
symbolic/emotional reality- or could it be a painting grounded in a 
more broadly shared reality? The answers affect how we8 think about 
the formulation and operation of our current bankruptcy system as it 
applies to individual debtors. 
In As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit 
in America, Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook9 
undertake the dual task of eradicating existing myths about individual 
debtors and their creditors while painting what they believe is a realis-
tic portrait of the participants in the bankruptcy process. As to the 
first goal, the authors are very successful. Through empirical data col-
lected from a study of 1529 individual debtor cases10 filed in three 
states in 1981, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook reveal how stereo-
types of debtors and creditors do not accurately describe actual debt-
ors or creditors (pp. 17-20, 242-43). As to the second goal, the authors 
significantly advance the development of an understanding of who our 
debtors and creditors are. With clarity and readability - a remarka-
ble accomplishment when dealing with vast quantities of numbers -
the authors reveal important and sometimes pathbreaking data about 
actual debtors and creditors. However, the latter effort does not yet 
complete the painting. As the authors acknowledge, there is a great 
deal yet to be learned before we can paint with confidence a portrait of 
debtors and creditors. Part One of this essay describes the ways in 
7. In speaking of "debtors" in this essay, I am specifically referring to persons who are the 
subject of a "case" under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988). I am not 
speaking of individuals with debts who have not sought protection and relief under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Further, when I speak of the "bankruptcy system" or the "bankruptcy laws," I am 
specifically addressing those provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to individual debtors. I 
am not addressing bankruptcy for corporations or other nonindividual debtors. 
8. "We" is a troubling term, and I use it throughout this essay with caution. The term "we" 
falsely implies homogeneity. It suggests that everyone speaks with the same voice and shares the 
same perspective. "We" also suggests that there is a distinguishable "they" and that "we" may 
be better than "they." See Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). 
9. Elizabeth Warren is a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook is Andrews & Kurth Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law 
School. Teresa Sullivan is a Professor of Sociology and Law at the University of Texas. 
10. The study actually looked at 1547 cases; the usable number of cases is 1529. Since more 
than half of the cases involved joint filings, the authors studied a total of 2409 individuals in 
bankruptcy. P. 17. 
1510 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1506 
which the authors accomplish the two above described tasks and eval-
uates their success in doing so. 
Part Two of this essay explores the consequences that flow from 
annihilating stereotypes11 and thereafter developing a bankruptcy sys-
tem more grounded in reality - that part of reality we now know 
something about and that which we have yet to discover. This is a 
task not undertaken by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook. As We For-
give Our Debtors ably describes the data collected and then carefully 
places that data in the context of existing bankruptcy policy debates. 
Adopting this more limited approach was not haphazard (pp. 10, 335, 
338). Apart from the obvious limitations of space, the more theoreti-
cal analysis could have undermined, at least in the authors' minds and 
perhaps in the minds of a significant portion of their readership, the 
bona fides of their data collection, assembly, and reportage. However, 
asking the unasked questions, moving into new spheres, and creating 
the dialogue that has not existed is what I seek to accomplish with the 
data. 
To these ends, I focus on women debtors. I pick up from where 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook leave off, moving from their data 
about women debtors into hypotheses about data yet to be uncovered 
and the theoretical implications of existing and future data (pp. 147-
65). It is, without question, a risky and speculative venture to attempt 
a re-vision of the bankruptcy system. 12 
Part Two of this essay is distinctly feminist. By using the word 
"feminist," I do not want to enter the debate among feminist theorists 
as to the meaning of the term. 13 Rather, I want to consider the exper-
11. Marsha Hanen expresses this point in her essay, Hanen, Feminism, Objectivity, and Legal 
Truth, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note*, at 29. She states: "Merely to break down rigid 
and unproductive systems of classification will not, by itself, lead to the more humane and co-
operative forms of knowledge, which is ultimately what we need, rather than just to new or 
altered frameworks. But the questioning of the categorizations, and the serious consideration 
(and even trying) of some alternatives, probably represents a necessary first step ...• " Id. at 44. 
12. The notion of risk-taking is consistent with the feminist approach described infra notes 
14, 47 and accompanying text. See c. HEILBRUN, WRITING A WOMAN'S LIFE (1988); West, 
Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (1989). As Carolyn Heilbrun ex-
presses at the end of her book on writing women's biographies and autobiographies, "[W)e 
should make use of our security, our seniority, to take risks, to make noise, to be courageous, to 
become unpopular." C. HEILBRUN, supra, at 131. Heilbrun makes a similar point in her work 
Reinventing Womanhood. c. HEILBRUN, REINVENTING WOMANHOOD (1979). She states, "The 
past is male. But it is all the past we have. We must use it, in order that the future will speak of 
womanhood, a condition full of risk, and variety, and discovery: in short, human." Id. at 212. 
13. A long and growing literature addresses the conflicts among feminists. See generally E. 
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); 
Minow, Feminist Reasoning: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 47 (1988); Resnik, 
supra note 1; Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 
(1986); Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 15 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 1990); Sunstein, Feminism and Legal 
Theory (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REV. 826 (1988); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). For a 
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iences of women in the bankruptcy system 14 as single and joint filers 
and as the nonfiling ex-wives, homesharers, and daughters of male 
debtors. 15 I investigate the significance that gender16 has played in 
shaping the bankruptcy system. I believe, as more fully developed, 
that the bankruptcy system has been developed and applied based on a 
prototypical debtor who is male. If this prototype is proved inaccurate 
- by describing male debtors erroneously and failing to consider wo-
men debtors at all - then the system created around the prototype is 
unresponsive to real debtors. This then raises for me the larger issue 
of whether the povertization of debtors - women debtors in particu-
lar - mirrors the povertization of these individuals outside the bank-
ruptcy system or whether, and by far more troubling to my mind, the 
bankruptcy system as developed, applied, or experienced actually con-
tributes to that povertization. 
As We Forgive Our Debtors is not a "feminist" book. It does pro-
vide, however, the empirical basis for beginning a theoretical inquiry, 
and in this way, the book opens the door for serious dialogue about the 
bankruptcy system. It provides an impetus to improve the lives of 
general discussion of the feminist movement "taken as a whole," see Bender, A Lawyer's Primer 
on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988). 
14. This approach is adapted from Lucinda Finley's articulation of the feminist perspective. 
Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 41, 42 n.1 (1989). Considering the experiences of women also suggests a different 
methodological approach. The value of women's experiences has been expressed elegantly by 
Mari J. Matsuda: 
In developing feminist theory, women are increasingly willing to critique mainstream theory 
and to sing unheard of songs. An important element of this project is the rejection of ex-
isting abstractions that constrain our vision. Abstraction is the key methodology in main-
stream jurisprudence .•.. The refusal to acknowledge context-to acknowledge the actual 
lives of human beings affected by a particular abstract principle - has meant time and again 
that women's well-grounded, experiential knowledge is subordinated to someone else's false 
abstract presumptions. 
Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of 
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613, 618-19 (1986). My methodology, then, I con-
sider feminist in that it both considers the experiences of women and asks different questions 
from those which a man would ask in the same situation. I also seek to raise consciousness and 
improve the lives of women debtors. For what precisely constitutes a feminist methodology and 
whether my approach is distinctly feminist, see FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY (S. Harding ed. 
1987) and Bartlett, Feminist Legal Method, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990). See also Cain, Femi-
nist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 195-97 (1990); 
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 587 (1990). 
15. This larger inquiry entails considerable historical, theoretical, narrative, empirical, and 
legal analyses, work which has not been completed as yet. See infra notes 90-93 and accompany-
ing text. 
16. I am using this term in the broadest sense, not solely in terms of issues of sameness and 
difference based on gender. I also propose to consider, within the rubric of "gender," issues of 
socioeconomic class and ethnicity as well. See Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: 
Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989). I also recognize 
that .not all feminists have a common view as to the meaning of gender and that many 
nonfeminists and some feminists equate the word "gender" with the word "sex." See D. RHODE, 
JUSTICE AND GENDER 5 (1989); see also Minow, supra note 13; West, supra note 13; Williams, 
supra note 13. 
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individual debtors in general and women debtors in particular.17 Cre-
ating the opportunity to consider these issues, perhaps more than any-
thing else, is the book's greatest strength. 
PART ONE 
A. The Modern Painting 
At first impression, it might seem an easy task to create a realistic 
painting of a contemporary American debtor family, given the literally 
hundreds of thousands of debtors who enter the bankruptcy system 
yearly. 18 And, in view of the recent overhauls of the federal bank-
ruptcy system, particularly its treatment of the individual debtor, one 
might suppose that legislators have a very good sense of who our debt-
ors and creditors actually are. However, if that objective reality had 
not been available to or perceived by them, one wonders what images 
legislators had when they created the elaborate network of legal norms 
17. This goal is also voiced by Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kanter. Millman & 
Kanter, Introduction to Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, in 
FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY, supra note 14, at 29, 35; see also Minow, supra note 13, at 49. 
18. There has been a significant increase in bankruptcy filings since the passage of the Bank· 
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The filing figures from the past several years, as reported by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, demonstrate this unequivocally: 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Total Filings 
344,275 
364,536 
477,856 
561,278 
594,567 
642,993 
The overall increase in filings for 1989 is primarily attributable to individual debtor (i.e., nonbusi· 
ness) filings. In 1989, nonbusiness filings represented 90% of all filings. It is anticipated that 
filings will rise to 850,000 by 1991. See Szczebak, Challenges Facing the Bankruptcy Court Sys-
tem in the 1990's, 9 ABI NEWSLETTER, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 6. 
Criticism of these statistics has been leveled at the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts. For example, it has been suggested that the filing rates may be somewhat inflated due to 
the methodology employed by the Administrative Office. There also has been concern as to the 
criteria employed to define business and nonbusiness filings. See p. 13 n.2; see also Sullivan, 
Warren & Westbrook, The Use of Empirical Data In Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 195. However, the Administrative Office remains the only 
official source for filing data and hence its figures, even if troubling, provide us with a starting 
place. 
The number of debtors tells only part of the story of bankruptcy's impact. For every debtor, 
one must also consider all of the debtor's dependents and others within the debtor's immediate 
(and remote) family. For example, in As We Forgive Our Debtors, Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook indicate that the family income of debtors entering the bankruptcy system is spread among 
more dependents than is the family income of those outside the bankruptcy system. See pp. 65-
66. The mean family size of debtors was one person more than that of nondebtors. P. 66. 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook also reveal that for every debtor, there are a considerable 
number of creditors. The 1529 debtors included in the Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook study 
identified 23,426 creditors of varying sorts, and there is every reason to believe that this number 
is artificially low since debtors may choose not to list creditors they intend to repay in full. P. 68. 
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and rules that balance the dramatically competing interests of individ-
ual debtors and their creditors. 
As remarkable as it may seem to nonlawyers and many nonban-
kruptcy lawyers, we have developed a personal bankruptcy system 
based principally on who we imagine individual debtors and their 
creditors to be, while remaining remarkably ignorant about who they 
really are. 19 Empirical data, while not a panacea, would provide the 
foundation for a clearer picture of reality.20 However, the vast major-
ity of empirical studies have been narrow in scope, subjected to criti-
cism, and, in some cases, simply not taken seriously enough. 21 What 
19. Some studies have looked at the bankruptcy system and issues involving individual debt-
ors in particular. For a sample of the available empirical work, see generally CREDIT REsEARCH 
CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY CoN-
SUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1982) [hereinafter PURDUE STUDY] (a study that provided much 
of the ammunition for passage of the Consumer Credit Amendments and was resoundingly criti-
qued by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook in Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to 
Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, and Warren, 
Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333 (1984)); GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 83-54, 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 - A BEFORE AND AFTER LooK (1983) (Report to the 
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives) GAO/GGD 83-54 (a 
nationwide mailing to' 804 debtors of whom approximately half responded, plus analysis of ap-
proximately 2250 case files) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANK-
RUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971) (looking at the bankruptcy system before The 
Reform Act was even drafted); Bermant & Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Cir-
cuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (1989); Boyes & Faith, Some Effects of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, 29 J.L. & EcoN. 139 (1986); Herbert & Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, 
Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Proceedings Closed During 1984-1987, 22 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 303 (1988); Herrmann, Families in Bankruptcy -A Survey of Recent Studies, J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 324 (1966) (each of the surveyed studies looked at limited geographic areas 
and antedated The Reform Act of 1978 by more than a decade); Perception and Reality, supra 
note 4 (looking solely at the perceptions of participants in the bankruptcy process in response to 
legislative change); Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & 
EcoN. 419 (1984); Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 Personal 
Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 COM. L.J. 288 (1983) [hereinafter Shuchman, The Average 
Bankrupt]; Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors 1982-1983: An Empirical Study, 15 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 541 (1985) (looking at a sample group of 186 debtors) [hereinafter Shuchman, New Jersey 
Debtors]; Shuchman & Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings and Other Pur-
poses, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1982) (a close examination of filings from a sample of approxi-
mately 525); Siporin, Bankruptcy Debtors and Their Families, Soc. WORK, July 1967, at 51 
(detailing two studies involving families in Kansas City and New Orleans). There are other data 
but some of them have not been published. For example, VISA has conducted a study of women 
debtors seeking relief under Chapter 7 in the Los Angeles area in 1988. (Correspondence and 
data from Irene Rutherglen, Risk Management and Security VISA U.S.A. Inc. to Karen Gross 
(Apr. 14, 1989) (on file with the author)). 
20. Data collection, like other scientific enterprises, is designed to produce objective results. 
But caution is required even with this more "objective" reality. Like a photographic image, 
empirical data do depict a reality; but it is not necessarily a complete reality. Even data collected 
consistent with accepted social science methodology is subject to interpretation. There are inter-
pretive issues concerning what was selected (or omitted) for study, what questions were asked (or 
not asked), and how conclusions should be drawn. Thus, a photograph can be a "real" depiction 
but what was chosen to be photographed may not represent the larger "reality." 
21. See supra note 19 (discussing some of the prior empirical work). Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook are understandably critical of much of the previous empirical work. Pp. 16-17; see 
also Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, supra note 19; Warren, supra note 19. Some of the work 
has sought purely economic explanations, an approach also critiqued by Sullivan, Warren, and 
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we have, then, is a legal system based upon an artist's impressions (i.e., 
a painting) of the individual debtor rather than more accurate mate-
rial. These artist's impressions are important, however. They explain 
how we constructed the bankruptcy system we have; they give us a 
starting point. But what we need and do not have is a more accurate 
and representational portrait of individual debtors in contemporary 
America. 
In As We Forgive Our Debtors, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
gathered "hard" empirical data from actual case files of debtors in 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas (pp. 17-20). Their study yielded al-
most a quarter of a million separate pieces of information about indi-
vidual debtors (p. 20). As We Forgive Our Debtors provides us a basis 
for more than supposition about the people and institutions touched 
by the bankruptcy system. 
Some of the information culled by Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook is new and dramatic,22 uncovering distortions in the bankruptcy 
system that require us to reevaluate some of our basic assumptions 
about how that system operates - both practically and theoreti-
cally. 23 These data also serve to explain why some of the anticipated 
consequences of the Reform Act of 197824 were never realized. Other 
findings revealed in As We Forgive Our Debtors are not shocking; they 
comport with what many of us would have anticipated,25 indicating 
that, in some respects, our imagery is consistent with a quantitative 
version of reality. But the fact that these findings are not startling 
does not diminish their significance. 
B. What the Data Reveal: Images of Individual Debtors 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suggest that we have two dis-
Westbrook in As We Forgive Our Debtors. Ch. 13; see also Boyes & Faith, supra note 19. Some 
of the work is dated or drawn from relatively small samples. And, some of the work is incom-
plete in that it relies on purely hard (quantitative) as opposed to soft (qualitative) data or the 
converse. 
However, the prior empirical work is considerably more valuable than Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook let on. First, one can compare the findings in As We Forgive Our Debtors with find-
ings from the foregoing studies. Many of the findings in the early works are confirmed by Sulli-
van, Warren, and Westbrook's work. This is significant in and of itself, for it demonstrates the 
validity of the earlier work, even if that validity is limited. It also reflects that not all of Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook's findings are new. The similarity in findings also demonstrates another 
point made by the authors, namely, the remarkable degree to which we have not taken empirical 
work seriously in bankruptcy. Pp. 15-17. 
Some of the information in the earlier studies can and should be compared with Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook's data. To the extent that the Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook findings 
differ from those of the earlier works, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook should provide some 
explanation. For example, are any differences due to different research methodologies or do they 
reflect markedly different views of what is happening in the bankruptcy system? 
22. See infra notes 30, 36-37, 71-80 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
24. See infra note 86. 
25. See infra note 31. 
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tinct mental images of individual debtors: the unemployed unfortu-
nate member of the lower class who legitimately seeks relief from the 
overwhelming burden of debt through a bankruptcy discharge and the 
middle (or even upper) class scoundrel who carefully manipulates the 
opportunities afforded by the bankruptcy laws for his own advan-
tage. 26 As We Forgive Our Debtors tells us that neither stereotype is an 
accurate description of all debtors. 27 
In many respects, the individual debtors examined by Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook appear remarkably similar to the rest of us. 
The vast majority were employed. Indeed, only 7% of the debtors 
stated specifically that they were unemployed,28 which is remarkable 
considering that during 1981, the national unemployment rate was 
7.6% (p. 86). They held a diverse range of jobs (pp. 86-91) and the 
"prestige"29 of the jobs held was not strikingly lower than that appli-
cable to most workers. 30 Like the general population, over half of the 
debtors owned a home (p. 129). The average home value for debtors 
was $50,000, compared to an average value of $56, 100 for Americans 
generally (p. 129). Most of the debtors used credit cards, which is not 
surprising in an economy in which 572.2 million credit cards were out-
standing in 1981 (2.5 cards for every adult and child in the United 
States) (p. 178). Stated simply, debtors live and work alongside the 
rest of us. 
But something is missing, because otherwise it is hard to explain 
why these debtors are in bankruptcy and the rest of the population is 
not. Debtors may have held jobs in the same industries as the general 
population, but they earned one third less in those jobs than 
26. Pp. 63, 102. Throughout this essay, the masculine pronoun is frequently used to repre-
sent all debtors. Since one of the purposes of this essay is to unsilence women debtors, this choice 
of pronoun requires explanation. First, the use of the male pronoun emphasizes the existing 
implicit assumption that all debtors are male. Moreover, the treatment of the so·called rogue 
debtor exemplifies the masculinity of the Bankruptcy Code, see infra notes 131-33 and accompa-
nying text, and hence the use of the male pronoun is particularly apt in this particularized 
context. 
27. For purposes of this review, I assume that the data collected and appearing in As We 
Forgive Our Debtors are not materially flawed. See infra note 83. I should also point out that in 
describing debtors and creditors based on these data, I am recounting 1981 data, which may not 
be equally applicable today. See infra notes 57, 83-87 and accompanying text. 
28. The number of unemployed debtors increases to 17% of the surveyed group if one in-
cludes aII those who responded ambiguously to questions regarding employment. Pp. 85-86. 
29. Prestige measures the "social standing" of a particular job. There is a range from 0 to 
100, with street sweepers ranking 11 and Supreme Court Justices ranking 84. Pp. 89-91 (refer-
ring to the work ofD. TREIMAN, OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
(1977)). Feminists and critical legal studies scholars would obviously have certain explanations 
for why jobs are ranked as they are and whether a ranking should even exist. 
The issue of prestige is associated with the issue of power or, in the case of women, the lack of 
power. See infra note 95 and accompanying text; see also C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED (1987); Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 11, 20-28 (1985) [hereinafter A Conversation]. 
30. Pp. 89-91. This is an example of where the findings of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
in As We Forgive Our Debtors differ from earlier studies. See Herrmann, supra note 19, at 325. 
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nondebtors.31 Debtors may have owned homes, but they had higher 
mortgages than homeowners outside the bankruptcy system and less 
income with which to repay them. 32 Almost one third of the debtors 
who had been permitted to incur a second mortgage had done so, com-
pared to 9.8% of homeowner~ in the general population (p. 134). The 
debtors may have had credit made available to them like the rest of the 
population, but 13% of the debtors owed more than half a year's in-
come on credit card debt and almost a third of the debtors owed at 
least three months' income on credit card debt (pp. 183-84). 
The authors chronicle other financial disparities. Twenty-five per-
cent of the debtors, compared to 12.5% of the general population, 
lived below the poverty level (p. 65). The average income of the debt-
ors was $15,800 compared to a mean income of $25,800 for those 
outside of bankruptcy (pp. 64-65). Debtors had substantially fewer 
assets than nondebtors and nearly twice the amount of debt (pp. 66, 
68). In terms of net worth, one third of the general population had a 
net worth under $5000 while 84% of the debtors had a net worth be-
low that level (p. 71). In terms of debt-to-income ratios, debtors had 
debts (excluding mortgages) equal to almost two years' income; among 
the general population, only 5% owed more than 20% of yearly in-
come in nonmortgage debt (p. 75). 
Other indicia suggest the distinct circumstances of debtors. The 
average size of the debtor family was almost one person larger than 
families outside bankruptcy (pp. 65-66). Many debtors experienced 
job interruptions, which meant that, while generally employed in the 
same industries and jobs as nondebtors, they earned less doing the 
same tasks (pp. 95-102). Thus, debtors had less money to spread 
among more people. But creditors continued to extend credit to debt-
ors, even to those who had experienced income volatility (pp. 316-19). 
As We Forgive Our Debtors reveals other facts about debtors that 
nullify our .stereotypes. Most debtors had not experienced crushing 
medical expenses that precipitated filing. 33 Very few debtors were re-
peat filers, with only 3.7% of them having received more than one 
31. P. 91. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook treat this finding as "key." P. 103. It is, but 
they are not the first to have noted it. See Herrmann, supra note 19, at 325; Shuchman, New 
Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 544. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook do develop their findings 
to a much greater extent than prior work, and they are dealing with a much larger sample. 
However, by dismissing earlier empirical work so summarily, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
fail to recognize one of the points they themselves make, namely, that empirical work is often not 
taken as seriously as it should be. P. 235; see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
32. Pp. 131-34. This finding is contradicted by the findings of Professor Shuchman. See 
Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 575-77. The difference between these findings 
merits an explanation since the debtors studied by Professor Shuchman were from cases filed in 
1982-1983, a time period proximate to that studied by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook. 
33. P. 170. This is another finding noted by Professor Shuchman. See Shuchman, New 
Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 570-71. 
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discharge.34 Many debtors were self-employed and their financial fail-
ure could be correlated in major respects to their business failure, 35 
demonstrating a heretofore largely undocumented link between small 
business and personal failure. 36 Most debtors were not capable of fully 
repaying their creditors in either liquidation or reorganization, a find-
ing contrary to a major empirical work that previously provided much 
of the impetus for stricter creditor protections.37 At most, 9% of the 
debtors in Chapter 7 could pay their creditors in full over a three-year 
period38 and 16% of the Chapter 13 debtors could repay creditors in 
full in the same period (p. 214). Debtors did not enter into the bank-
ruptcy system casually; their decisions were motivated by a host of 
factors (pp. 243-54). Few debtors appeared to be true abusers of the 
bankruptcy process (pp. 184-88). Many debtors were women (p. 149) 
and most of these women were poorer than their male counterparts. 39 
C. The Consequences of Destroying Stereotypes 
The annihilation of stereotypes has material consequences. Legis-
lators formulating the Bankruptcy Code, judges interpreting that 
Code, and individuals affected by the bankruptcy process appear to 
have been guided by mistaken images of debtors.40 Complaints about 
34. P. 194. This finding is enlightening since Congress enacted a new provision in 1984, as 
part of the Consumer Credit Amendments, specifically to curb the many perceived repeat filings. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (1988). 
35. For a recent article looking at dischargeability of individuals for debts arising in a small 
business context, see Scott & Leonard, The Special Case of the Small Businessman, 63RD AN-
NUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, 5-37 (Professional 
Educ. Systems Inc. ed. 1989) [hereinafter NATL. CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES]. 
36. Pp. 111-12, 118-21. This link was previously observed by Professor Shuchman, who 
stated with respect to his study of 753 personal filings: "A significant number of personal bank-
ruptcy filings are obviously the result of small business failures. The filings are labeled personal, 
however, because the proprietors were personally liable for debts of the business and most of 
these business failures were of self-employed persons and couples engaged in a variety of very 
small commercial enterprises and occupations." Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt, supra note 
19, at 288; see also Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 544 (observing that 11 % of 
filings were business-related). 
37. Pp. 199-224; see PURDUE STUDY, supra note 19. Despite the criticisms leveled at it, the 
Purdue Study has been influential. See Perception and Reality, supra note 4; Gross, Preserving a 
Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit 
Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 76-81 (1986). 
38. P. 212. Three years is the standard length of a Chapter 13 reorganization plan, although 
a court can extend the time· to not more than five years. Pp. 25-37; see 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) 
(1988). 
39. Pp. 151-55. The women debtors were either the wives of male debtors or single-filing 
debtors. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook note that women debtors appeared in 74% of the 
cases studied. P. 150. Professor Shuchman also observed the large number of women debtors. 
See Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 544. For a detailed discussion of the find-
ings regarding women debtors, see infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text. 
40. This point is made in more sweeping fashion by Richard Sherwin who suggests that if we 
take our personalized discourse as the only voice, we close ourselves off to the other voices and 
communities. See Sherwin, Law, Violence, and Illiberal Belief, 78 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1990). 
Our perceptions have served to create the current system at two levels. First, they account 
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the bankruptcy system and its operation become easier to understand 
once it is recognized that at least one of the reasons is not that the 
bankruptcy law is, per se, inadequate,41 but that, in many respects, it 
has been designed to deal with problems and people that were 
imagined to exist but do not, in fact, exist (or at least not in the way 
they were imagined). These conclusions necessitate that we reimagine 
the painting of debtors. A more persuasive image of debtors, based on 
increased data, calls for a re-vision of bankruptcy policy - as it is 
formulated and applied. 
A central myth struck down by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's 
data is our perception of only two types of debtors - the scoundrel 
and the genuinely impoverished person.42 In fact, the data demon-
strate that debtors, while they share certain characteristics (e.g., they 
owe substantial percentages of their income to creditors), are far from 
homogeneous (pp. 49-59). This heterogeneity enriches our vision of 
debtors,43 but it makes us uncomfortable.44 It makes easy categoriza-
for the schism in the bankruptcy laws between individual and business filings. Individual debtors 
are treated differently from corporate debtors, and individual debtors with consumer debts are 
treated differently from individuals with business debtors. See Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day 
Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990). Second, 
our perceptions affect how the system has treated individual debtors themselves. They have 
shaped the choices available to individual debtors within the bankruptcy system. 
For an overview of the options available to individual debtors, see generally R. AARON, 
BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (1990); BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AND STRATEGY (A. Res-
nick ed. 1987); R. GINSBERG, BANKRUPTCY (1989); ]. KOSEL, BANKRUPTCY Do IT YOURSELF 
(1987); H. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1988); E. WARREN 
& ]. WESrBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 
(1986). 
41. There may be other, external reasons for failure in the bankruptcy system. See Perception 
and Reality, supra note 4. 
42. In operation, the Bankruptcy Code is not as simplistic as our perceptions of debtors. The 
Code is drafted to recognize that not all debtors fall into these two categories. Some debtors can 
be "part" rogue. The Code's sensitivity to this is revealed in its compromises, the choices as to 
what obligations are dischargeable, and what type of priority should be accorded what type of 
creditor. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 523, 727 (1988) • 
43. Professor Spelman raises this point in the context of feminist theory. If we stoop to our 
lowest common denominator (i.e., women are biologically different from men), we undervalue 
our differences. "Indeed, positing an essential 'womanness' has the effect of making women ines-
sential in a variety of ways. First of all, if there is an essential womanness that all women have 
and have always had, then we needn't know anything about any woman in particular." E. SPEL· 
MAN, supra note 13, at 158. 
44. Again, Professor Spelman makes this point with clarity and sensitivity in her book Ines-
sential Woman, where she draws on the problems of Uncle Theo in Iris Murdock's novel, Tlte 
Nice and the Good. Uncle Theo is troubled by the multiplicity of the pebbles on the beach. He 
would rather reduce the plurality to one. See id. at 1-2. The absence of multiple images has also 
been a problem in feminist thought. As Spelman states, "[M]uch of dominant Western feminist 
thought has shared Uncle Theo's dismay and discomfort with manyness, [and] has been uneasy 
about the enormous variety of women and women's experiences." Id. at 160; see also Minow, 
Introduction: Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 
(1989). Professor Minow notes that by avoiding focusing on differences among individuals and 
subgroups, feminists have become Jocked in a battle over gender differences. It is only if we focus 
on our multiplicity that we can begin to envision and achieve social change. Ruth Side! suggests 
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tion impossible.45 It becomes harder to develop legislation that 
works.46 Homogeneity in the bankruptcy context also has helped us 
to escape a moral dilemma. It is easier for us to live with ourselves if 
we can blame some debtors (e.g., the scoundrels) for their own finan-
cial predicament while feeling sorry for others (i.e., the impoverished 
person) who got into their predicament through events they could not 
control. In both cases, it is a way of denying that we too might be 
debtors - that would be too frightening because it would suggest that 
bankruptcy could happen to any of us (p. 103). Confronting heteroge-
neity makes us confront ourselves.47 
The structure of the bankruptcy system, in terms of the options 
available to individual debtors also appears to have been shaped by the 
stereotypic dyad of the scoundrel and the impoverished unfortunate. 
Bankruptcy offers individual debtors two basic choices: liquidation 
and reorganization.48 An underlying premise for cases involving indi-
vidual debtors is that the impoverished debtor should be allowed to 
liquidate and start afresh; this unfortunate but honest person will be 
unable to reorganize because he is unemployed or earning very little.49 
that we dehumanize because then it is easier for us to deal with others. R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN LAST xvi-xvii (1986). 
It is interesting to note that several authors, in a recent paper, have attempted to explain 
corporate bankruptcy based on the mathematics of chaos - perhaps another way of dealing with 
the lack of simple explanations for bankruptcy and the lack of homogeneity in the system. 
Utilizing this approach recognizes the multiple variables that need to be considered. It allows 
one to see patterns within apparent chaos. See M. MacDonald, M. MacDonald & C. McLeod, 
Pictures Are Worth a Thousand Words: Understanding the Chapter 11 Process Through Mod-
els and Simulations (1989) (unpublished paper on file with the author). Their work, like this 
review, relies on visual imagery to explain their thesis. 
45. The inherent problems of classification have been a concern of feminist scholars. See 
Hanen, supra note 11; Scales-Trent, supra note 16. An example of an effort at categorization is 
revealed by the oft-repeated statement that bankruptcy relief is available to the "honest but un-
fortunate" debtor. This term and its history are described in greater detail in Gross, supra note 
40. This phrase mirrors our image of debtors: we want to help poor, unemployed debtors (sup-
posedly because we feel sorry for them), but we do not believe bankruptcy should help the well-
to-do manipulator of the bankruptcy system (supposedly because what he is doing is morally 
repugnant). The problem is that the phrase is functional only if we assume - lock, stock, and 
barrel - that we can recognize which debtors are honest and which are not. At a fundamental 
level, there is also an assumption that the very categorization itself is correct. 
46. For a discussion of the need for a pluralistic vision in another legal area, see Dowd, Work 
and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructur-
ing the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L .REV. 79 (1989). 
47. Another way of articulating the consequences of declassifying is that it empowers indi-
viduals to define themselves. It reveals a refusal to accept old definitions and asserts that some 
new order must be reckoned with. For an application of this in the feminist context, see Scales-
Trent, supra note 16, at 42-44; see also Bender, supra note 13. A corollary is that homogeneity 
moves us toward greater objectivity while heterogeneity moves us toward greater subjectivity. 
Robin West suggests, consistent with this point, that feminists should not be afraid to speak 
subjectively, not only to express their own experiences but to express their unspoken (but felt) 
rage. See West, supra note 12; see also Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspec-
tives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986). 
48. Chapter 7 is the liquidation chapter and Chapter 13 is the reorganization chapter most 
utilized by individuals. See Gross, supra note 37; Gross, supra note 40. 
49. This assumption is embodied in Chapter 7, the liquidation chapter of the Code. 11 
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There is a further assumption that this individual has only limited as-
sets. Therefore, he is allowed to exempt his necessaries, although 
there is a sense that there will not be much to exempt in any event. so 
In contrast, the scoundrel should only be permitted to reorganize, 
as the liquidation option would provide too easy a way out of his obli-
gations. 51 It is assumed that the scoundrel, who is fortunate and dis-
honest, can and should repay his creditors (pp. 5-7). Indeed, the 
bankruptcy laws are designed to discourage the scoundrel from avoid-
ing the preferred scenario, reorganization, by seeking to liquidate. 
This is accomplished by setting the level of exempt property so that 
the liquidating debtor must give up more of his assets52 and by making 
reorganization more attractive by expanding the scope of the reorgani-
zation discharge. 53 By these means, the scoundrel, who would ostensi-
bly have a greater amount of property that is nonexempt and a greater 
percentage of debt that is nondischargeable, 54 is presumably discour-
aged from liquidating. 
An effort to go even further and preclude the availability of the 
U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988). We permit the Chapter 7 debtor to retain future earnings so he can 
have a fresh start. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988). This is based, I suspect, on the assumption that 
these future earnings will not be high. In contrast, Chapter 13 debtors cannot keep their future 
earnings. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (1988). This is because, at least in part, there is an assumption 
that Chapter 13 debtors will have a sizable income with which to pay creditors. These assump· 
tions also account for the marked antipathy of courts, creditors, and commentators to zero re-
payment plans in Chapter 13. See Note, Good Faith and the Zero Repayment Plan in Chapter 13, 
69 KY. L.J. 327 (1981); Comment, Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankroptcy Code: Treating 
the Symptom, Not the Cause, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1985). 
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988). For a detailed account of exemption law, see R. AARON, supra 
note 40; J. BERG & s. JENSEN-CONKLIN, CoNSUMER BANKRUPTCY (1989); R. GINSBERG, supra 
note 40; J. KOSEL, supra note 40; Koffler, The Bankroptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reex-
amination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22 (1983). 
51. This is because a liquidation discharge would permit him to keep all of his future earn· 
ings. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 541, 727 (1988). Moreover, the exemptions are, at least in some 
jurisdictions, quite generous so that the liquidating debtor is able to retain a large portion of his 
assets. See R. GINSBERG, supra note 40; J. KOSEL, supra note 40; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY: 
EXEMPTIONS (15th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1989). 
52. There is an assumption in this: altering exemption levels will alter debtor behavior. This 
assumption has been placed in considerable doubt by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook and 
others. See pp. 232-34; Shuchman & Rhorer, supra note 19. But see Woodward & Woodward, 
Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Bankroptcy: An Empirical Study, 88 COM. L.J. 309 
(1983). 
In a reorganization case, in contrast to a liquidation case, the debtor does not have to divest 
himself of any of his property. Although exemptions technically apply in Chapter 13, their rele-
vance is principally to determine whether a Chapter 13 plan can be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 
(1988). 
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988). Under Chapter 13, the debtor is permitted to discharge a host 
of debts that are nondischargeable under Chapter 7. This is accomplished by limiting the appli-
cability of § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
54. This assumption is based on the fact that in Chapter 7, debt incurred through false pre-
tenses or in a fraudulent manner is nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4) (1988). A 
scoundrel, in all likelihood, would have incurred his obligations fraudulently and hence, would 
want a bankruptcy chapter that could relieve him of these obligations. Section 1328 accom-
plishes just that. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988). 
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liquidation option to the scoundrel debtor was made in 1984 through 
two distinct changes to the Bankruptcy Code. The first further limited 
exemptions on the theory that this would inhibit filing altogether55 and 
the second specifically empowered the court to dismiss the case of a 
debtor who substantially abuses the bankruptcy process, with abuse 
being judicially interpreted to include seeking to liquidate when one is 
capable of reorganizing. 56 
Neither of the 1984 amendments discussed above could be directly 
studied by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook because the cases they 
evaluated were filed in 1981 and the amendments did not go into effect 
until three years later. Subsequent empirical data do demonstrate that 
at least the addition of section 707(b) appears not to have reduced the 
level of filings nor shifted debtor filings from Chapter 7 to Chapter 
13.57 This result is not surprising, though, when it is recognized that 
the changes to the Bankruptcy Code were based on mistaken assump-
tions as to who our debtors are and how they behave. 58 There are 
certainly debtors who are impoverished, and some who are scoundrels, 
SS. Narrowing the exemptions was accomplished by the 1984 amendments, which amended 
§ S22(b), (d)(3), and (d)(S). 11 U.S.C. § S22(b), (d)(3), (d)(S) (1988). As noted earlier, there had 
been some early work suggesting that limitations on exemptions would curtail debtor access to 
relief. See pp. 232-33 (criticizing this work and suggesting that simple economic models do not 
work); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, S3 CORNELL L. 
REV. 663 (1968). However, some empirical data have suggested just the opposite. See supra note 
S2. 
S6. This is also reflected in the 1984 amendments by the passage of§ 707(b) and the addition 
of§ 132S(b). 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b), 132S(b) (1988); see Breitowitz, New Developments in Con-
sumer Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse': 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
33 (1986); Gross, supra note 37, at 8S-140. Although the term "substantial abuse" has not been 
defined by the Code, courts have increasingly utilized the term to mean that debtors who could 
repay their creditors in a Chapter 13 filing but elect not to do so cannot be permitted to liquidate 
and obtain a discharge. For a compendium of cases, see Gross, supra note 37; Gross, supra note 
40. Several recent cases have also taken this expansive view. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th 
Cir. 1989); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989). 
But see In re Braley 103 Bankr. 7S8 {Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Wegner, 91 Bankr. 8S4 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); see also p. 221. 
S7. Gross, supra note 40; Perception and Reality, supra note 4, at 68-69, reprinted at 1S2-S3; 
see also supra note 18 (revealing the rise in filing rates). Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook also 
note this failure. Pp. 199-270. 
S8. Less obvious examples of the consequences of lumping debtors into simplistic categories 
on the basis of false assumptions can be found. The bankruptcy laws operate from the premise 
that the only debtors who should reorganize are individuals with regular income (scoundrels) 
because "poor" debtors are not working or not earning enough to reorganize. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 109(e}, 101(29) (1988). But the facts show this is not true. Some but not all debtors are that 
poor, and some debtors may want to reorganize even if they do not have regular income. 
Another example is the assumption that the only debtors who will seek joint relief will be a 
husband and wife, thus accounting for the limiting language in 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) which 
permits joint petitions only among married couples. While various courts have overridden this 
explicit statutory provision under the guise of interpretation, other courts have felt constrained 
by its limitations. See In re Lam, 98 Bankr. 96S (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Pipes, 78 Bankr. 
981 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Malone, SO Bankr. 2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 198S). Considering 
the changing nature of the family, it is time the Bankruptcy Code began to keep pace. See The 
Changing Role of the Family in the Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689 (1989); see also Braschi v. 
Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, S43 N.E.2d 49, S44 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (gay life partner of 
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but there are many who do not fall into either category.59 
Moreover, the distinctions between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and 
the option accorded the debtor to choose between the chapters or stay 
outside the bankruptcy system altogether, also assume that we can 
easily identify the scoundrels who do exist and that debtor behavior is 
motivated by a single factor, such as the level of exemptions. 60 As We 
Forgive Our Debtors demonstrates that both of these assumptions are 
incorrect. 
For example, while there is no definition of "scoundrel," there is a 
perception that many of the "scoundrels" abuse credit card debt. 
They spend beyond their means and then choose not to repay. Using 
various definitions of credit card abuse,61 Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook are unable to identify characteristics of or predict who will be 
abusers (pp. 187-88). Moreover, even if identified, few scoundrels can 
fully repay creditors in a Chapter 13 plan; and such plans appear to be 
hardly the be-all and end-all, given their marked rate of failure. 62 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook also demonstrate that while it 
might appear that exemption levels would dictate debtor behavior (pp. 
233-34, 240-42), debtor behavior cannot be explained simplistically 
deceased rent-controlled tenant entitled to succeed to leasehold as "family member" of de-
ceased). 
Professor Dowd expresses the risks of stereotyping with clarity. 
[T]he workplace structure incorporates a rigid conception of the family. That conception is 
one of a patriarchal family: a male wage earner in the paid workforce married to a stay-at-
home female spouse who performs the unpaid housework and childcare. However, only a 
minority of families, fewer than ten percent, conform to this pattern and are served by the 
existing benefit structure. 
The great majority of families are characterized by enormous diversity and fluidity. This 
diversity includes single parent, blended, unmarried and homosexual families. The domi-
nant earner patterns in the workforce are now dual-earner and single-parent/single-earner 
families .... 
Yet, the workplace structure makes no allowance for this diversity and unduly burdens 
the majority of families. 
Dowd, supra note 46, at 105-06 (footnotes omitted). 
59. There may be other reasons for the failure of the 1984 amendments to accomplish what 
at least the credit industry and some members of Congress thought they would achieve, such as 
judicial temperament or regional bias. It is also possible that the 1984 amendments were never 
intended to accomplish what some expected them to achieve, but were adopted with an underly-
ing assumption that they were doomed to failure, solely to appease the demands of a special 
interest group whose acquiescence to other desperately needed legislation was essential. The 
latter obviously presents a rather cynical view of the legislative process. 
60. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suggest that this approach can be identified as the 
"economic model." This model assumes that debtors are economic maximizers who will respond 
to economic incentives and disincentives. Pp. 230-34. 
61. Pp. 184-87. One method is to look at disproportionate credit relative to income. An-
other is to look at debt composition, defining an abuser as an individual with at least $100 in 
credit card debt and which debt represents at least 75% of the total unsecured debt. The third 
method is to look at the debtors reporting the largest credit card use. Id. 
62. Pp. 213-17. Failure of Chapter 13 cases involved those which were converted to Chapter 
7 or dismissed. Troubled Chapter 13 cases were those in which either no plan was confirmed or 
there were signs of trouble (e.g., motion to dismiss or convert). Thirty-two percent of the Chap-
ter 13 cases had failed and 31% were troubled. Pp. 215-17. 
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(pp. 254-55). Like the heterogeneity among debtors, there is a host of 
factors affecting debtor behavior - economic variables, social-demo-
graphic variables, and local legal cultures (pp. 242-52). We are con-
fronted with complexity and a lack of easy answers. 63 
The data assembled by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook thus 
demonstrate that no single painting premised in reality could depict a 
prototypical individual debtor family. Indeed, these data provide the 
palette for a variety of paintings, each representing a differing (albeit 
accurate) version of the family in debt. The collection would be like a 
child's flip book - a series of different pictures of the same scene, all 
of which create a moving image of the debtor. But these data also 
provide material for other images that are largely ignored by the Mar-
tineau painting, a vast panorama of people and entities that are inte-
grally involved in the bankruptcy process - creditors (pp. 9, 12, 273). 
D. Completing the Picture: The Image of Creditors 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argue that, just as we have ste-
reotypes of debtors, we have stereotypes of creditors (p. 273). In par-
ticular, we have viewed creditors monolithically, ignoring the diversity 
that exists among them (pp. 273-76). This, too, has distorted our per-
spective of bankruptcy. 
As We Forgive Our Debtors looks at three distinct groups of credi-
tors: commercial (business) lenders, consumer lenders, and reluctant 
lenders (pp. 274-76). A better understanding of who creditors actually 
are allows us to ascertain whether our basic bankruptcy premise that, 
with limited exceptions, all creditors should be treated alike is a sound 
one and whether it has produced desirable results.64 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's data reveal that en-
trepreneurial debtors have debts more than three times as great as 
those of wage-earners (p. 283). Although commercial lenders lend 
more to entrepreneurs than to wage-earners (p. 284-88) and business 
loans present greater risks than consumer loans (p. 288), these lenders 
have not obtained added collateral that might have improved their po-
sition in the bankruptcy context. 65 It may be that commercial lenders 
63. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook provide a wonderful diagram which, even for those 
unaccustomed to dealing with statistical material, reveals the complexity of the factors to be 
taken into account when addressing debtor behavior. P. 257. I find it striking, though, that a 
variable missing from this chart is gender. For more on the implications of this omission, see 
infra notes 103-06, 142-45, and accompanying text. 
64. Pp. 279-80. For an overview of the treatment of creditors in bankruptcy, see generally 
M. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1986 & Supp. 1989); L. LoPUCKI, STRAT-
EGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS (1988 & Supp. 1989); P. MURPHY, 
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY (1987); R. ROSENBERG & M. LUREY, COLLIER LENDING 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (1986). 
65. Pp. 288-89. The entitlement of secured creditors in bankruptcy is ably explained in M. 
BIENENSTOCK, supra note 64, at 159-236. 
1524 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1506 
are willing to take added risk with entrepreneurial borrowers because, 
on balance, they derive more profit from these borrowers (p. 289). 
The consumer credit industry accounts for the greatest percentage 
of debt - approximately 87% (p. 303). Approximately two thirds in 
dollar amount of this debt was categorized by debtors as "secured," a 
significant portion of which would be repaid by debtors themselves or 
through the proceeds of the collateral (pp. 303-04). The unsecured 
debt arises from uncollateralized extensions of credit and the under-
secured portion of the secured creditors' claims. 66 Credit card issuers, 
credit unions, and gasoline companies totalled a surprisingly low 9% 
of the total debt due the consumer credit industry. Credit cards, the 
supposed cause of most individuals' financial woes, constituted a mere 
3% of the credit industry debt (p. 306). The bulk of the consumer 
debt was due to banks, mortgage companies, retail stores, and finance 
companies (p. 306). While some of these creditors asked for security, 
others did not. Many of those who did get security found that it was 
worth far less than the debt (pp. 306-12). Most creditors, both secured 
and unsecured, did not continue to seek information about their debt-
ors on an ongoing basis, a practice that might have enabled them to 
make better judgments about whether and to what extent to continue 
extending credit (pp. 313-19). While the credit industry has been vo-
cal in demanding greater bankruptcy reforms to remedy its losses from 
individual bankruptcies,67 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook point out 
that the total bankruptcy loss is similar to what it cost the credit in-
dustry in postage in 1981 to send monthly statements to every credit 
card holder (p. 320). 
Reluctant creditors (such as tort victims, ex-spouses, hospitals, the 
Internal Revenue Service, public utilities, and the like) are very differ-
ent from commercial lenders and the consumer credit industry (p. 
293). Most reluctant creditors never intended to enter into a debtor/ 
creditor relationship with the debtor, but landed there by circum-
stance or government regulation (pp. 293-94). Among reluctant credi-
tors, tort victims, while small in number, were owed the highest per-
debtor amount (a mean of $15,100) (pp. 295-96). Surprisingly, only 
2% of the amount due reluctant creditors consisted of arrearages for 
alimony and child support. 68 More than half the wage-earner debtors 
66. A secured creditor is only secured to the extent of the value of the collateral in which he 
has an interest. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). Therefore, a secured creditor whose collateral is 
worth less than the loan value has an unsecured claim to the extent of the deficiency. 
67. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 37, at 61-62. 
68. P. 296. All the data presented by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook assume that what the 
debtor lists on his schedules is accurate. For example, the data assume that the debtor has 
accurately reported his income. When the numbers generated from the data produce conclusions 
that run counter to what many of us would expect in light of other empirical data, however, it is 
time to question the accuracy of what the bankruptcy files show. Obviously, the extent to which 
inaccuracies exist alters the conclusions we can draw. 
An example of this is alimony and child support. Since there is a growing number of separa-
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owed some health care debts, although the amounts reported were 
small (p. 297). Only 20% of the debtors owed back taxes (p. 297). In 
view of the preferred status of secured creditors and the statutory pri-
orities among unsecured creditors - for which reluctant creditors 
(save the government) do not qualify, 69 there is little possible recovery 
for this category of claimant (pp. 299-300). Reluctant creditors are, at 
least arguably, a group that merits more sympathy than other credi-
tors who could have better controlled their destiny but failed (either 
intentionally or negligently) to do so. Perhaps, then, consideration 
should be given to according special priorities for reluctant creditors. 
These descriptions further illuminate the picture of the individual 
debtor in bankruptcy. There is no single Scrooge-like creditor exact-
ing the last penny from his impoverished debtor. There is a range of 
creditors, some sophisticated, some aggressively incautious, and some 
involuntary. Our sympathies are not (and in my view should not be) 
the same for all of them. The data reported by Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook allow us to reconsider the treatment we have accorded 
creditors, and to consider variations in the risk that different creditors 
bear in extending credit, as well as the extent to which we want to 
preserve an economy with relatively easy access to credit. 
E. Women Debtors - Breaking the Silence 
The foundation for an analysis of bankruptcy from a feminist per-
spective can be found within Chapter Eight of As We Forgive Our 
Debtors, which is devoted entirely to women debtors (pp. 147-65). 
The authors accomplish what has never been done before on a com-
prehensive scale - they consider the experiences of women debtors 
within the bankruptcy system. 70 They break the silence that has for so 
tions and divorces, it is worth asking whether debtors underreport their obligations in this area. 
P. 296. If there is such underreporting, is it because the debtors intend to pay these obligations 
despite bankruptcy? Or are debtors hiding the obligations to prevent their spouses/ex-spouses 
(usually women) from finding out about the filing and thereby depriving them of payments they 
would continue to get under applicable bankruptcy law? The latter would not be an absurd 
possibility. Cf R. SANDERS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1981 (Advance Report) (Bureau 
of the Census, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 124 1983); Yee, 
What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment and Enforce-
ment of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DEN. L.J. 21 (1979). 
69. 11 u.s.c. § 507 (1988). 
70. Addressing issues of women debtors is not altogether new. Some data on women debtors 
have appeared in the writings of Professors Shuchman and Herrmann. See Herrmann, supra 
note 19; Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt, supra note 19; Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra 
note 19. However, these works are not as comprehensive as that of Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook. At the same time, it would have been valuable had Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
compared their findings with the existing data. 
In a recent symposium reviewing As We Forgive Our Debtors, Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman 
addresses the topic of women debtors in an article titled Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond. 
Wiseman, Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond, 65 IND. L.J. 107 (1989). The actual discussion of 
women debtors is brief - 10 pages. Professor Wiseman suggests that we still need to ask, "What 
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long disempowered women.11 
The data on women debtors are among the most dramatic of those 
presented in As We Forgive Our Debtors. Women debtors comprise a 
surprisingly high number of those who seek relief. Twenty-six percent 
of all filings studied were by single-filing men72 and seventeen percent 
were by single-filing women (pp. 149-50). Fifty-seven percent of all 
filings were joint. 73 Stated differently, seventy-four percent of all cases 
involved a woman debtor, compared to eighty-three percent of the 
cases which involved a male debtor, and forty percent of debtors filing 
singly were women. Reflecting upon the Martineau painting for a mo-
ment, it is clear that in the United States today, the portrait could well 
be painted without a male debtor; indeed, a woman might be found 
standing in the place of the rogue-like son. 74 
The single-filing women were predominantly unmarried (p. 150). 
Their financial position was, in a word, horrendous. Family income of 
households with a working male debtor averaged approximately 
$18,000.75 Family income of households with a single-filing woman 
debtor averaged $10,600.76 These data are consistent with studies 
would a woman-centered view of bankruptcy look like?" Id. at 119. Among others, I hope this 
is one of the issues I begin to answer in this piece. See infra notes 94-219 and accompanying text. 
71. Recognizing and curing the silence of women has been one of the themes of the feminist 
movement and one of its contributions to legal and nonlegal scholarship. See, e.g., Harding, 
Introduction: ls There a Feminist Method?, in FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY, supra note 14, at 1, 
6-7; C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE AP-
PROACH TO ETHICS (1984); Bartlett, supra note 14; Bender, supra note 13; Frug, Re-Reading 
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); Hous-
ton, Gilligan and the Politics of a Distinctive Women's Morality, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 
supra note*, at 168-89; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's 
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Resnik, supra note 1; Sunstein, supra 
note 13. 
It is striking that despite the prevalence of bankruptcy, there is also something like a conspir-
acy of silence surrounding it. In a status report on women in 1988-1989, there is not a single 
reference to bankruptcy, although there are hosts of references to the povertization of women. 
See THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1988-1989 (S. Rix ed. 1988). 
72. The term "single" filer does not refer to marital status; rather, it is used to distinguish 
between individuals filing alone rather than jointly. 
73> The prevalence of joint filings also needs to be investigated further. Most married indi-
viduals seem to file jointly. Since many couples who filed jointly only had a single income, we 
have to question whether they each were similarly indebted. Moreover, we have to consider 
whether the joint filing was necessary from the wife's perspective. See infra note 80 and accom-
panying text. 
74. There has been some suggestion that the rate of filing among single-filing women debtors 
has increased. Seep. 147; Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt, supra note 19, at 289. Remarka-
bly, data on the number of male and female debtors have not been maintained by the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts. Requests by this author to the Administrative Office to 
collect this data either prospectively and retrospectively have not been granted. See Letter from 
L. Ralph Mecham to Karen Gross (May 22, 1989) (on file with author). 
75. This figure is applicable to all male debtors, whether filing singly and jointly. P. 151, 
Table 8.1. 
76. P. 152. Professor Shuchman also observed that women debtors earned less than their 
male counterparts. See Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 550. His data show 
that male debtors earned an average of $14,725, compared to women debtors who earned on 
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outside the bankruptcy field demonstrating that women earn less than 
men. 71 If one omitted all income from other sources and considered 
only the income of the primary earner in a family, the gap between 
male and single-filing female debtors narrowed but remained large (p. 
152). Single-filing women debtors earned sixty-five cents for every dol-
lar earned by male debtors (p. 152), remaining close to the 1981 fed-
eral poverty line of $9300 (p. 65). 
The income disparity is highlighted by the fact that male and sin-
gle-filing female debtors had markedly different employment. Women 
debtors generally had jobs associated with higher prestige than those 
of male debtors (pp. 152-53). However, the single-filing women debt-
ors had lower income (p. 153). These women debtors also had very 
different wages than their male counterparts within the same occupa-
tion (p. 153). These findings, again, reflect similar data outside the 
bankruptcy system: women generally have less earning power than 
their male counterparts. 1s 
Other financial data revealed that single-filing women debtors had 
fewer debts (but more unsecured debt) than their male counterparts 
but fewer assets with which to repay those debts (pp. 153-55). Single-
filing women debtors had median assets of $6400, compared to 
$25,500 for joint filers. Single-filing women owed approximately 
$20,000, compared to joint filers who had twice that amount of debt 
(pp. 153-55). 
As We Forgive Our Debtors concludes that women debtors are at 
the bottom end of the debtor financial spectrum, yet seek relief under 
the Code when they are in positions of financial collapse comparable 
to male debtors (p. 155). However, it would appear that, in the case of 
the single-filing woman debtor, a small unanticipated expense might 
put women debtors over the edge, while single-filing male debtors and 
joint filers could withstand more of life's unexpected events (p. 156). 
For single-filing' women, receiving or not receiving supplemental in-
average $10,269. Id. What is remarkable, however, is how Professor Shuchman characterizes 
what, even in his data as opposed to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's, is a 20% differential. 
He states that women debtors earned "somewhat" less than male debtors. A differential in this 
amount hardly qualifies as "somewhat" different! In empirical work, a difference of this sort is 
dramatic. 
77. P. 152. See generally THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1988·1989, supra note 71 (containing 
numerous charts setting forth empirical data about the status of women); A. KESSLER-HARRIS, 
WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED (1981). The status of women has also been a topic in the 
popular press. The New York Times, for example, published a three-part series of articles in 1989 
titled Women's Lives: A Scoreboard of Change. See Dione, Struggle for Work and Family Fuel-
ing Women's Movement, N.Y.Times, Aug. 22, 1989, at Al, col. l; Cowan, Women's Gains on the 
Job: Not Without a Heavy Toll. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at Al, col. l; Belkin, Bars to Equal-
ity of Sexes Seen as Eroding, Slowly, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 1; see also D. 
RHODE, supra note 16, at 162-63. 
78. P. 153; see supra note 77 and accompanying text. Professor Rhode devotes an entire 
chapter (titled Equality in Form and Equality in Fact: Women and Work) in her book to these 
issues. See D. RHODE, supra note 16, at 161-210. 
1528 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1506 
come may be the difference between seeking bankruptcy relief and 
staying outside the bankruptcy system (p. 156). And more women 
single filers than their male counterparts may be too poor to seek relief 
in the first instance - they may be unable to retain counsel and/ or 
pay the requisite filing fee. 79 
The information about jointly filing women is even more startling. 
Married families in bankruptcy were one-income families (i.e., only 
one spouse working) in much greater proportion than in the general 
population.80 In joint filings, many of the wives who did work did not 
do so full time, explaining why the average income of debtor-wives 
was $6000 compared to $8557 for wives in the general population (p. 
157). It would not be inconceivable, in view of other lobbying efforts 
of the consumer credit community, for this group to seek enhance-
ment of recoveries from married debtors by suggesting limitations on 
discharge unless both spouses work (pp. 158-59). 
The remaining finding about women in the bankruptcy system re-
vealed by As We Forgive Our Debtors involves indebtedness for health 
care benefits. Single-filing women had a higher ratio of medical debts 
to income than any other category of debtor (p. 171). While the fact 
that women have higher medical expenses than men may account par-
tially for the higher level of medical debt for women, 81 a more likely 
cause is their lack of health care coverage as compared to that of other 
debtors. It appears that women worked in industries with lower fringe 
benefits; as a result, many of their medical expenses were not covered 
by insurance. 82 For many women, bankruptcy becomes the health in-
surer of last resort (pp. 174-75). 
79. P. 158. It is somewhat ironic that bankruptcy is one legal proceeding which cannot be 
filed in fenna pauperis. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). The filing fees are not 
low, and Congress recently authorized increases from $90 to $120 for Chapters 7 and 13, which 
change became effective December 21, 1989. Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Appropria-
tions Act, H.R. 2991. Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 406(a), 103 Stat. 988, 1016. In addition, the 
amount of the fee could govern debtor choice. Chapters 7 and 13 are the least expensive chap-
ters; Chapter 11 is the most costly. 
One other new fee deserves special attention because of its potential adverse impact on wo-
men - the new $60 filing fee for relief from the automatic stay. Commerce, Justice, State and 
Judiciary Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 406(a). This new fee creates an added cost 
to nonfiling individuals (predominantly women) whose former spouses have sought bankruptcy 
relief. Nonfiling individuals will now have to pay a "user" fee of $60 to go back to state court to 
seek increased alimony or child support. They might also need to pay the fee to recover unpaid 
alimony or child support from property of the estate which is not within the§ 362(b) exceptions 
to the stay but which is nondischargeable under § 523. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(2), 523(a)(S). 
80. P. 156. There is no evidence that in joint filings there was an effort to omit a spouse's 
income. All this suggests is that debtor families, more than nondebtor families, do not have dual 
incomes. Stated differently, debtor families are more "traditional." 
81. See EcONOMICS AND HEALTH CARE 140 (J. McKinlay ed. 1981): "The constant posi-
tive sign on the sex variable ... suggests that females demand more or have a higher utilization 
rate than males." 
82. Pp. 171. The study does not reveal whether or to what extent pregnancy-related medical 
expenses account for any of these medical debts, or whether the reduced employment and income 
levels of single women are a principal factor. 
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F. Questioning Completeness 
In two respects, however, I question the degree to which we can 
infer that Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's data present a realistic 
and complete painting of a debtor family today. 83 My first concern 
goes to whether the data is current; my second concern goes to reli-
ance on hard data. As to the first concern, the authors recognize the 
problem but are confident that even though they used cases filed in 
1981, the data generated are equally applicable today (pp. 19-20). In 
fact, they refer to another empirical study (for which I served as the 
Reporter)84 to support their conclusion that data from 1981 remain 
accurate today. 8s 
I recognize that the process of hard data collection and interpreta-
tion is extremely time-consuming. The delays cannot be blamed on 
anyone. But the absence of fault does not eliminate the fact that 1981 
data are not current. Since 1981, the Bankruptcy Code has twice been 
amended in material respects, and both of these amendments (the con-
sumer credit amendments and the 1986 amendments) affect the treat-
83. These criticisms are not directed at methodology. As I am only too well aware, it is very 
easy to take potshots at empirical work. One can always question the methods of data collection. 
Indeed, these very concerns may discourage scholars from undertaking empirical work in the 
first place. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 18. Instead, I am expressing concern 
over how the data can be used and what conclusions can be drawn from the data presented. This 
is a different order of criticism. 
For the sake of completeness, however, it is worth noting that some methodological criticisms 
can be leveled at As We Forgive Our Debtors. Of those that I note, I do not consider any to be 
serious flaws. Several examples suffice. As We Forgive Our Debtors utilizes cases from three 
·states - Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas. An effort was made to look at both urban and rural 
areas within each state. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook are confident that these three states 
present a representative sample of debtors nationally and thus are willing to extrapolate national 
norms from data generated in these three states. Pp. 18-19. This is tricky stuff. As noted at 
length in Perception and Reality, supra note 4, bankruptcy law appears to be practiced very 
differently in different parts of the country. Individual debtors may also be different in different 
parts of the country. There has been some evidence to this effect. See Miller, Consumer Plan-
ning for Bankruptcy Relief. in NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, supra note 
35, at 5-5, 5-12. Thus, while As We Forgive Our Debtors is broader in scope and more compre-
hensive than virtually any preceding study, caution is needed before assuming that we now have 
a complete national picture of individual debtors. 
I also suspect that the authors underplay the importance of what their study does not show. 
They recognize that the critical time period in evaluating debtors may be the two-year period 
before relief is actually sought under the Bankruptcy Code. Pp. 98-102. What this really means 
is that we may find some of the most significant learning in data not yet examined. Professor 
Shuchrnan has attempted to look at some of this data. See Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra 
note 19, at 557-59. For example, these data suggest that one third of the debtors unsuccessfully 
tried to work out their problems outside the bankruptcy system. Id. at 559. 
84. See Perception and Reality, supra note 4. 
85. Pp. 19-20. The conclusions of this study do indicate, as noted by Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook, that the 1984 amendments did not change consumer bankruptcy practice in major 
ways. P. 19. However, that does not necessarily mean that debtors also remaiped unchanged. 
Debtors could have changed substantially and the bankruptcy system could have proceeded 
without taking these changes into account. Indeed, it seems more probable to me that the bank-
ruptcy system proceeded without recognizing the changing character of debtors than that debt-
ors remained the same over the years between 1981 and 1990. 
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ment of individual debtors. B6 In addition, a broad range of other 
societal changes may have had an impact on the bankruptcy process. 
We must consider broad changes in the national economy (e.g., the 
shift from a manufacturing to a service economy with concomitant 
changes in the demand for manual versus white-collar labor), rates of 
interest on consumer debts, unemployment levels, increased access to 
and use of credit by women, altered family structure and work pat-
terns, decreases in governmental spending on social welfare programs, 
nonindexing of minimum wage and social security payments, increas-
ing drug abuse, no-fault divorce laws, changing views of the morality 
of bankruptcy relief (particularly in light of well-publicized corporate 
filings), and the quality and personal biases of the many new judges 
appointed to the bankruptcy bench, to name but a handful. Therefore, 
it seems not just possible but likely that individual debtors today are 
different from those of 1981. We cannot know for sure until 1990 data 
becomes available. Until then, we should be cautious about extensive 
reliance on 1981 data.B7 
My second concern is that Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook pri-
marily focus on quantitative (or "hard") data.BB As expressed poign-
antly by Ruth Sidel: "Statistics ... are 'people with the tears washed 
off.' "B9 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook have tried to humanize 
their story of debtors and creditors by giving us portraits of different 
86. The entire bankruptcy system was revised with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at scattered sections 
of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); see Chatz, Costello & Gross, An Overview of the Bankruptcy Code, 
84 CoM. L.J., June/July 1979, at 259. The Reform Act has been amended twice in major re-
spects. See The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered statutes in 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.), 
and the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered statutes in 11 
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Reform Act has also been amended, though in less far-reaching 
ways, on other occasions since 1978. See, e.g., The Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (1988); An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Law to 
Provide for Special Revenue Bonds, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-597, 102 Stat. 3027 
(1988); see also Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal 
on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse," 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (1985); Breitowitz, supra note 56; 
Cornish & Herbert, The Debtor's Dilemma: Disposable Income as the Cost of Chapter 13 Dis-
charge, 47 LA. L. REv. 47 (1986); Herbert, Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends: The 1986 
Reforms of the Reformed Bankruptcy Reform Act," 16 CAP. U. L. REV. 325 (1987); Morris, 
Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 91 (1985). 
87. Professor Schuck has most recently articulated the cry for more empirical data. Schuck, 
Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 323 (1989). Pro-
fessor Schuck suggests nine factors for the paucity: inconvenience, lack of control, tedium, un-
certainty, ideology, resources, time, tenure, and training. Id. at 331-33. 
88. The authors did not interview individual debtors and creditors systematically. They did, 
however, interview some of the key participants in the bankruptcy process - lawyers, judges, 
trustees. Pp. 351-52. These participants are, however, not the primary characters and in this 
sense, their stories do not supplant those of the actual people for whom bankruptcy is an experi-
ence only they can describe. 
89. R. SJDEL, supra note 44, at xvi. 
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individuals (pp. 49-62). They recognize that numbers can obfuscate 
the emotions of debtors and their creditors (p. 5). Numbers cannot 
tell us everything; they cannot quantify the moral choices confronting 
debtors or the pain of not being able to succeed (pp. 8-9). Therefore, 
as the authors recognize, the portrait they paint is not complete. 
To me, among the most striking features of the Martineau painting 
are the faces of the family members and, in particular, the differences 
among the faces of the men on the one hand and the women on the 
other. The faces give the painting its passion. In many respects, for 
all its strengths, the pictures painted by As We Forgive Our Debtors are 
faceless, because faces cannot be painted with only the data from case 
files. We need perspectival data.9° Among other things,91 we need 
detailed interviews with debtors and creditors, interviews that probe a 
range of psychological issues, such as how debtors feel about being in 
debt, how they feel about accessing the bankruptcy system, how they 
feel during the progress of their cases, and how they feel when the 
cases are finished. These data are difficult to obtain,92 as individuals 
are no doubt reluctant to divulge their personal feelings and, indeed, 
may have difficulty identifying or articulating them. However, in the 
limited situations where it has been attempted, the results have pro-
vided unique insights. 93 
This added perspectival data, together with current quantitative 
data, would lead to a richer and more objectivity-enhancing portrait of 
debtors. But, my two criticisms do not eradicate the import of Sulli-
van, Warren, and Westbrook's study. The authors have given us a 
significantly more complete painting than we had before. It is an im-
portant painting. But we need others. Part Two of the essay begins 
the analysis of what new paintings might look like and the conse-
quences that flow from their possible creation. 
90. A further benefit of perceptual data is that it can be gathered more quickly than quantita-
tive data and perhaps less expensively as well. See Perception and Reality, supra note 4, at 6-7 
(original report), reprinted at 90-91. The importance of perceptual data has been recognized by 
other bankruptcy researchers. See Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 541. 
91. There is also a need for more empirical data about what happens to debtors before filing 
under the Bankruptcy Code and what happens to them after filing. Consider, for example, how 
important it is to the fresh start policy to know how many debts a debtor actually reaffirms 
(formally or informally) or voluntarily repays. 
92. David Stanley and Marjorie Girth did conduct interviews of debtors and gathered some 
information about their reaction to the bankruptcy process. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra 
note 19. This information is obviously dated, and the amount of data gathered is limited. Inter-
views were also used in the PURDUE STUDY, supra note 19, and questionnaires were sent to 
debtors in the GAO REPORT, supra note 19. Professor Shuchman also did some interviewing 
and recognized the difficulty of obtaining responses. Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 
19, at 542-43. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook conducted some interviews as well; however, 
these interviews were only of the bankruptcy professionals. Pp. 351-53. 
93. See Siporin, supra note 19, at 55-60 Many wives reportedly turned against their hus-
bands, finding them inadequate. Id. at 59. Many family members expressed feelings of intense 
rage, exhaustion, and defeat before filing. Id. 
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II. RE-VISION: BANKRUPTCY FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 
A. Thinking About Women Debtors 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's data about women debtors un-
derscore the povertization of women generally or, as characterized by 
some, the feminization of poverty.94 Women debtors are living on the 
edge. Bankruptcy is a symptom of this much larger problem. The 
data collected by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suggest that a par-
tial explanation of the poverty of single-filing women debtors is their 
absence of power. 95 This lack of power leads women into jobs that do 
not generate substantial income and include few fringe benefits. The 
difference between survival and failure for many of these women debt-
ors is supplemental income, derived in many instances from former 
spouses, again making women economically dependent. 
The dramatically revealing data about women debtors appearing in 
As We Forgive Our Debtors has made me think about how the bank-
ruptcy system treats women generally. At present, we lack the empiri-
cal data to answer that inquiry. This is where the theorizing and 
hypothesizing come in. What I suggest in this essay are various ave-
nues of inquiry in respect to women debtors and a framework within 
which to consider these issues on a go-forward basis. I also seek to 
concretize my theoretical suggestions, applying theory to practice.96 
We have to investigate whether the bankruptcy system is not sim-
94. See Parnas & Cermak, Rethinking Child Support, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 759 (1989); 
Pearce, Welfare Is Not For Women: Toward a Model of Advocacy to Meet the Needs of Women 
in Poverty, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 412 (1985); Williams, supra note 13, at 798, 824-27. Ruth 
Side! suggests that the phrase was first coined by Diana Pearce. R. SJDEL, supra note 44, at 15. 
In defining "feminization of poverty," Diana Pearce states: "Whether as widows, divorcees or 
unmarried mothers, women have always experienced more poverty than men. But in the last two 
decades, families maintained by women alone have increased from 36 percent to about 50 percent 
of all poor families. That is the feminization of poverty." Pearce, supra, at 412. 
95. See Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Williams, 
supra note 13. In explaining the wage gap between men and women, Joan Williams explains that 
the gap reveals an "integrated system of power relations that systematically disadvantages WO· 
men." Id. at 826. Catharine MacKinnon also states this point in her writings. As expressed in 
her conversation with other feminists at a symposium at Buffalo Law School, "[T]he problem of 
inequality is the problem of the subordination of women and not the inaccurate differentiation 
between people on the basis of sex • . • . Gender becomes a question of how people who do not 
have power are going to get some, and how people who do not have a voice are going to be able 
to speak in anything other than a male voice in a higher register." A Conversation, supra note 29, 
at 27-28. 
96. In the literature to date, the application of feminist theory to doctrinal law has been 
primarily concerned with noncommercial areas such as family law, rape law, discrimination law, 
and tort law. See, e.g., S. EsTR1cH, REAL RAPE (1987); Bender, supra note 13; Chamallas & 
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); 
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Dcci-
sionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988); Finley, supra note 14; Law, Women, Work, Welfare, 
and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983); Olsen, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). There are a 
growing number of exceptions. See, e.g., Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several 
Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1990); Simpson, Femi-
nist Theory, Crime, and Justice, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 605 (1989). The mismatch between theory 
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• ply mirroring the condition of women outside of bankruptcy but also 
is contributing to that condition. It is necessary to see first whether, as 
applied, the Bankruptcy Code perpetuates women's povertization. 97 
But I think we have to look beyond any disparate impact the Code 
may evidence. We have to look at the fundamental principles underly-
ing the system to ascertain whether by excluding the experiences of 
women from bankruptcy jurisprudence, we have created a bankruptcy 
system that is phallocentric. If the bankruptcy laws are premised on a 
male model, then the Bankruptcy Code may reinforce the condition in 
which women debtors find themselves.98 
A major caveat is in order. Discussions of women debtors to date 
have been silent as to certain additional (albeit not unique) character-
istics of women debtors that would both enrich and complicate the 
analysis. To date, there has not been a systematic analysis of male and 
female debtors on the basis of race or religion.99 Although there is 
some suggestion that there may a higher percentage of minority debt-
ors than nonminority debtors, 100 this topic has never been the subject 
of detailed and broad-based study. Since the status of black women is 
generally more bleak than that of white women, 101 the observations 
about povertization of debtors becomes more acute for black women 
debtors. Any complete discussion of women debtors would have to 
account for a much more varied portrait than that uncovered in As We 
Forgive Our Debtors. In some respects, simply talking about women 
debtors as a group runs afoul of the concern of recent feminists that 
when we talk about women generally, we are usually thinking only 
about white, middle-class, Protestant women and, as such, fail to ac-
count for the subjective, personal circumstances of many other 
women. 102 Many of the women debtors about whom I now write 
would have a different background from mine and hence may rightly 
question my ability to speak for them. 
There is no simple way of approaching these complex issues in-
and practice is a troubling one in legal academia. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or. 
If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 343 (1989). 
97. Diana Pearce makes this point in the context of programs designed to assist the poor 
(e.g., welfare, unemployment, AFDC). Interestingly, bankruptcy is never mentioned as such a 
program. In explaining the inadequacies of the current program, Pearce states: "First, women's 
poverty is fundamentally different from that experienced by men and second, women are sub-
jected to programs designed for poor men. Poor women find these programs are not only inade-
quate and inappropriate, but also lock them into a life of poverty." Pearce, supra note 94, at 413. 
98. See supra note 26. 
99. Some discussion of race (not correlated to gender) appears in White, Personal Bankruptcy 
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.· An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1 (1987); see also 
Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 546-47. 
100. Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors, supra note 19, at 546. 
101. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN WOMAN: 1988-1989, supra note 71; Scales-Trent, supra note 
16. The failure to hear the voices of black women appears most recently in Angela Harris' 
powerful article, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). 
102. See E. SPELMAN, supra note 13. 
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volving women debtors. I suggest we think about women debtors at· 
three stages - before, during, and after a bankruptcy filing. There is 
some overlap of issues in these three stages but they provide a way of 
addressing a broad range of concerns. The most manageable task is to 
look at what happens to women debtors during a bankruptcy case. In 
that context, we must look initially at how a facially gender-neutral 
statute, the Bankruptcy Code, is applied. 103 For example, we must 
consider whether women debtors are treated in the same way as their 
male counterparts when a bankruptcy court determines legal issues. 
In addition, we must look at how the Code is interpreted, and consider 
whether the judicial definitions of statutorily undefined terms in some 
way affect women debtors adversely. 104 Then, we must look beyond 
the law, as applied and interpreted, and examine how judges and the 
U.S. Trustees speak to and treat women debtors when they meet them 
in person.105 We must look at the words employed and the kind of 
narrative discourse followed in the judges' opinions. 106 We must look 
at the stories told by the debtors themselves in the documents they 
have filed with the court. And, we must look at the stories those docu-
ments do not tell; we have to investigate the gaps in those docu-
103. The fact that a statute is facially gender-neutral gives us small solace when the statute in 
question lends itself to discriminatory application and, in fact, is discriminatorily applied. Ob-
taining neutrality was the task of stage-one feminists. See Scales, supra note 13. An example of 
this type of problem appears in employment law and the application or affirmative action princi-
ples, a topic which has obviously generated considerable debate. See D. RHODE, supra note 16; 
Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers" -Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals 
and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 45 (1989); Williams, supra note 13. 
104. See infra note 180. A striking example of this problem is rape law. As Susan Estrich 
points out, the problem with rape law is not only the statutes but how courts have defined the 
operative terms used in those statutes (e.g., "consent"). See S. Esrn!CH, REAL RAPE, supra note 
96. (1987). In describing Estrich's work, Kim Scheppele terms it "re-visionary." See Scheppele, 
supra note •, at 1100. What makes Estrich's work re-visionist is her suggestion that we should 
begin to see things differently. For example, we should define "no" not from the male perspective 
but from a female perspective. If this is accomplished, the scope of what constitutes real rape 
will extend beyond physically forced sexual intercourse between two strangers. Id. 
105. For a discussion of gender bias by the judiciary, see Report of the New York Task Force 
on Women in the Courts, IS FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1986); Resnik, supra note I; Schafran, 
Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus of Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1989). 
In a statement for the hearings on The Federal Courts Study Committee, Professor Judith Res-
nik noted the bias in courtrooms. She also objected to the Committee's effort to create a small, 
elite federal judiciary. Under the Committee's proposal, bankruptcy judges would not be ele-
vated to article III status while tax court judges would. Moreover, Title VII cases would be 
decided by article I rather than article III judges. Statement of Judith Resnik for the hearings on 
The Federal Courts Study Comm. (1990) (copy on file with author). This leaves the distinct 
impression that the people's problems are not significant enough for the elite federal judiciary 
who do not want, in Justice Scalia's words, to be burdened with the routine. For women debtors, 
this is another example of their problems not being considered important. 
106. There is a wealth of literature on the importance of the stories told. See generally J.B. 
WHITE, HERCULES. Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW (1985); J.B. 
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING (1984); Scheppele, supra note 8; Sherwin, A 
Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Story Telling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543 
(1988). 
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ments. 107 Finally, we have to look at whether the stereotyped images 
of the male debtor are transferred to women debtors, creating a bank-
ruptcy system unrecognizing of the experiences of many who seek its 
benefits.1os 
But what happens to women debtors during a case tells only part 
of the story. We must look at women debtors before they file because 
this is where their story actually begins.109 We must consider whether 
single women debtors are using the bankruptcy system in the same 
way male debtors are. I am not referrillg to whether the Code is, as a 
legal matter, equally available to male and female debtors. It is. I am 
asking first whether single women are as aware as men of the availabil-
ity of bankruptcy as an option to assist them, whether they have been 
educated about the possibilities of bankruptcy relief. 110 In addition, I 
am asking whether women, even if aware of the bankruptcy option, 
are socially, morally, or psychologically as able as men to partake of 
whatever benefits it has to offer. Stated simply, do women think about 
debt (and its avoidance) in the same way as men?111 And, if not, do 
women think about debt (and its avoidance) in a manner that discour-
ages their participation in the bankruptcy process? 
Looking at women in debt before filing and during a case is not 
enough, however. We must look at women debtors after discharge, 
the legal mechanism for providing a fresh start. We must look at 
whether women debtors are actually experiencing a fresh start. 112 
} 
107. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suspect that many of the case files they investigated 
did not contain all of the information regarding those cases. Pp. 68, 134-35, 169, 296; see also 
supra note 68. Debtors frequently omitted information. It is possible that single-filing women 
debtors select what information they want to list and omit key creditors from their schedules 
since any nonlisted creditor will not be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1988). To date, no 
formal interviews of women (or men) debtors have been conducted to determine the extent to 
which these speculations are accurate. 
108. Of course, we should be concerned if male debtors are also subjected to particular treat-
ment based on erroneous stereotypes of them. See supra notes 26-31, 40-42, 56-58 and accompa-
nying text. 
109. See supra notes 83, 102 and accompanying text. Determining where the story begins is 
also a concern of those interested in legal storytelling. See A. DANTO, NARRATION AND 
KNOWLEDGE (1985). 
110. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. 
111. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
112. The Code has several discharge provisions. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727, 1141, 1328 
(1988). The discharge in Chapter 7 is narrower than the Chapter 13 discharge. Although there 
has been a growing literature about the theoretical underpinnings of the fresh start policy in 
individual bankruptcy cases, the topic has not as yet, in my view, received sufficient analysis. As 
suggested here, we must begin by defining what kind of fresh start we are talking about. For 
current literature on the theoretical aspects of the fresh start policy, see T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC 
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986); Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and Interpretive Theory, 21 R.IcH. L. REv. 49 (1986); How-
ard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987); Jackson, The 
Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1985). See also Wiseman, supra note 
70, at 118-19. She states, "Even the best legal representation, free or at a low cost, for women in 
bankruptcy will not address the more fundamental issues of the economic straits of women's 
1536 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1506 
This fresh start can be experienced at several levels. A debtor can be 
legally excused from existing financial commitments. 113 But legal ex-
cuse does not mean the debtor is psychologically excused. To have a 
real fresh start, one needs to be relieved of one's sense of obligation to 
one's creditors. A fresh start also means (or at least should mean) that 
the debtor will have a new opportunity for self-realization. 114 If bank-
ruptcy does not provide that opportunity, then the fresh start obtained 
may be illusory. 115 
Even the three-stage analysis of women debtors before, during, and 
after filing, however, is by itself insuffi.cient.116 There are whole cate-
gories of women who have not been represented in this analytic frame-
work.117 These are the women whose names do not appear on 
petitions as either single or joint filers. These are the women who are 
the wives, ex-wives, homesharers, lovers, and daughters of debtors. 
They experience bankruptcy without being official participants. But 
bankruptcy affects them directly; bankruptcy judges make decisions 
that affect the way they will live. Data about them does not appear in 
As We Forgive Our Debtors or any other empirical work. Nor are they 
mentioned in the academic literature. Their needs and concerns and 
the impact of a bankruptcy on them must be evaluated. They have 
been truly silenced. 
B. Before the Filing 
1. A Lack of Knowledge 
The ability of women (and men) to use the bankruptcy system 
hinges, at least in part, on their awareness of the benefits the bank-
ruptcy system can offer them. Although we do not have data on wo-
men's knowledge of bankruptcy in particular, there is considerable 
empirical work suggesting that women are generally less aware than 
men of the legal options available to them. 118 There are also data indi-
lives." Id. at 118. However, as I suggest, economic relief is only a piece of the broader quest of 
women for a true fresh start. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. 
113. 11 u.s.c. §§ 727, 1328 (1988). 
114. In her criticism of the poverty programs now in existence, Pearce observes that they 
reinforce the disadvantaged position of women. Pearce, supra note 94, at 415; see also Boshkoff, 
The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Discharged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract 
Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L.J. 36 (1971). 
115. This aspect of the analysis also applies to how we think about the debtor before and 
during the case. See infra notes 118-212 and accompanying text. 
116. A legitimate consideration throughout this analysis is whether male debtors are freed of 
stereotypes. We have not investigated the male debtor's fresh start either, to give one example. 
Therefore, although it is certainly beyond the scope of this essay, some consideration should be 
given to broadening our inquiry into the debtor/creditor relationship. 
117. The analysis has also not taken account of other factors affecting women debtors such as 
minority status and religion. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
118. Women's ignorance of the legal system can be attributed to the "maleness" of the sys· 
tern and the easy access men have had to the system - as lawyers, judges, and legislators. See 
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eating that women are generally less knowledgeable about financial 
matters and less comfortable in dealing with such matters than their 
male counterparts.119 Indeed, data suggest that women handle money 
differently from men.120 There also is an acknowledged link between 
money and power.121 In contemporary American society, women 
have less power than men. 122 Perhaps this means most women have 
less money than men. Or, perhaps it is the other way around. Be-
cause most women have less money than men, they also have less 
power. 
In terms of knowledge of bankruptcy in particular, a preliminary 
analysis of several popular legal guides specifically designed for 
women readers suggests that bankruptcy is not an encouraged option 
for them. 123 It is possible that the absence of knowledge about bank-
ruptcy and lack of encouragement to seek relief before one is in ex-
tremis is an issue extending beyond the bookstore literature. Even 
though we cannot now qqantify this knowledge base, the bookstore 
literature at least raises the possibility that women may not be aware 
of or encouraged to use the bankruptcy option.124 Moreover, even if 
aware of the bankruptcy option, women may be unaware of the two 
alternatives within the bankruptcy system - liquidation and reorgani-
zation - and how to evaluate their choices. 125 
Menkel-Meadows, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in 
the Law, 42 u. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987). 
119. See generally P. CHESLER & E. GOODMAN, WOMEN, MONEY & POWER (1976); 
Wernimont & Fitzpatrick, The Meaning of Money, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 218 (1972). 
120. P. CHESLER & E. GOODMAN, supra note 119. 
121. As expressed by Phyllis Chesler and Emily Goodman, "Money is the thirteenth power. 
Money is human energy trapped and counted in measures of gold, silver, and paper. Money is 
love. Money is sex. Money is life - or time." Id. at 249-50. 
122. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 29; Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimina-
tion, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 264 (1989). 
123. One legal guide for women recommends bankruptcy only when a debtor is in really bad 
trouble. Vogel, Contracts and Credit, in EVERYWOMAN'S LEGAL GUIDE 3, 25-26 (B. Burnett 
ed. 1983). Another guide addressing separation and divorce referred to bankruptcy only in rela-
tion to a woman's husband and the consequences of such a filing on a wife. Nowhere does the 
author consider the possibility of the wife filing for relief. N. HARWOOD, A WOMAN'S LEGAL 
GUIDE TO SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ALL 50 STATES 25 (1985). There is a striking excep-
tion to this. One of the leading popular guides to bankruptcy is written by a woman and does use 
examples of women debtors - single- and joint-filing debtors. See J. KOSEL, supra note 40. 
These guides also recoguize the moral problem many debtors may feel in considering bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 1. However, guides on bankruptcy are only useful if an individual has sufficient 
knowledge and money to consider buying the book in the first instance. If bankruptcy is not one 
of the considered options, a book about it is not likely to be useful. 
124. The possibility of women availing themselves of the bankruptcy system in greater num-
bers suggests that the knowledge curve is increasing. See supra note 74; Shuchman, New Jersey 
Debtors, supra note 19; Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt, supra note 19. However, there are no 
recent data to confirm this. 
125. As previously noted, see supra note 118, men may also be ignorant of the legal options 
of bankruptcy. Even if men are ignorant of the opportunities accorded by bankruptcy, it is likely 
that women are even more ignorant. 
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2. The Fresh Start Mentality 
I suspect that even if women are aware of bankruptcy as an option, 
they may not view the discharge of debt in the same way male debtors 
do. 126 Women debtors may not be as willing as male debtors to leave 
their creditors in the lurch. 127 Maybe women are, then, uncomforta-
ble with at least a major premise underlying the fresh start policy. 
The attitude toward discharge within the Bankruptcy Code is com-
plicated and returns us to the stereotypes that Part One of this essay 
showed are inconsistent with the empirical data, but still pervasive in 
our thinking. 128 For the poor, unfortunate debtor, discharge seems to 
be an accepted way of permitting an individual to be freed from his 
obligations with society recognizing the debtor's plight. It is society's 
way of relieving the debtor of responsibility. 129 However, the attitude 
toward discharge for the rogue debtor is different. For this debtor, we 
adopt the dominant stereotype of masculinity, namely the independ-
ent, selfish, autonomous, self-actualizing individual of the classical lib-
eral school of thought. Bo 
However, for both stereotypic debtors, discharge requires that the 
debtor adopt a "screw-you" approach to his creditors. 131 A debtor 
who meets the statutory requirements can liquidate his or her assets 
(keeping exempt property) and basically say "screw you" to his or her 
creditors. This debtor can then begin anew. For the impoverished 
debtor, it is an acceptable "screwing" while for the rogue debtor, it is 
not. For all debtors, it assumes the rogue masculine mentality. 
This approach to discharge is particularly troubling for women 
debtors who, while closer to the stereotypical poor debtor, may think 
of themselves or may be perceived by others as closer to the stereotypi-
cal rogue. 132 For this category of debtor, the masculine "screw-you" 
126. A full discussion of the reasons for this position appears infra at notes 132-46 and ac-
companying text. 
127. See infra text accompanying note 146. 
128. See supra notes 20, 26-43, and accompanying text. 
129. One way of seeing this is the inapplicability of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) to this category 
of debtor. 
130. For a discussion of this view, see West, supra note 13. 
131. The characterization of the bankruptcy discharge in this manner is mine. However, the 
description is keyed to an appreciation of what happens to creditors in bankruptcy. What I am 
suggesting is the underlying but unarticulated essence of bankruptcy in its rawest form. The 
term "screw you" has sexual connotations, and they are intended. The power that men can exert 
over women in a relationship involving intercourse frequently places women in a subordinated 
position. Therefore, it is men who can screw women and men who can screw their creditors. 
Women, on the other hand, are generally perceived and referred to in the sexual context as those 
who get screwed. And, relative to men, they are screwed. For women to adopt the "screw you" 
approach inherent in pursuing a bankruptcy discharge requires their integration of an essentially 
male value system. 
132. Indeed, what is and is not a rogue debtor is not altogether clear. Rogue could mean 
someone who partakes of the opportunities offered by the Code; it could also mean someone who 
has systematically defrauded creditors. The debtor who seeks discharge by liquidating rather 
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approach may not work because the underlying assumption is that 
either stereotypic category of debtor seeking discharge is comfortable 
saying "screw-you" to creditors. It is presumed that the debtor is will-
ing to break from their creditors with a large measure of emotional 
and moral impunity. Or, perhaps the debtor must be willing to break 
with his or her creditors and withstand the sense of failure and self-
worthlessness that may follow. 
It is useful, in this context, to return to the Martineau painting. 
The painting clearly depicts a rogue-like father and son who are com-
fortable with the bankruptcy discharge. They do not seem concerned 
with losing the family home. They also do not appear concerned 
about their creditors. Indeed, they seem to feel relieved; they can be-
gin afresh. Their expressions exhibit optimism. In contrast, the fe-
males in the picture are hardly optimistic. The liquidation of their 
assets and the severance of their relationships with crepitors hardly 
seem a boon to them; they seem far less able to break apart from their 
past. The wife, positioned between her eager husband and her dis-
traught mother-in-law and young daughter, appears tom apart. 133 
Indeed, if I were to paint a picture of individual debtors today, not 
only would many of them be women but their facial expressions, as the 
manifestation of their feelings, would differ from that of the rogue-like 
son in Martineau's painting. The single-filing woman debtor would 
not necessarily have her hand raised, delighted at the thought of start-
ing over. I suspect she would look much like the wife in Martineau's 
painting - tom with conflict and fearful of what the future holds for 
her. She would be uncomfortable with and perhaps threatened by her 
"fresh start." 
The possibility of differing perceptions of the fresh start offered by 
bankruptcy hinges, at least in part, on an awareness that bankruptcy, 
at its root, involves a moral dilemma.134 As Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook suggest, bankruptcy calls into question moral values (pp. 
8-9), forcing us to think about the circumstances under which individ-
uals ought to be relieved of their financial obligations.135 At what 
than reorganizing when capable of repaying creditors can also be viewed as a rogue. It is no 
small wonder that women might define themselves as rogues based on their own sense of respon-
sibility rather than the Code's or society's less harsh categorization. 
133. This difference in approach is consistent with the work of a number of feminist scholars 
including Nel Noddings, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Judith Resnik, Barbara Houston. See N. 
NODDINGS, supra note 71; Houston, Gilligan and the Politics of a Distinctive Women's Morality, 
in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note *, at 168; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71; Resnik, supra 
note I. 
134. It is interesting that the word "bankrupt" has also been used to suggest being bereft of 
morals. Joan Williams states: "Do such phenomena mean that feminists' traditional focus on 
gender-neutrality is a bankrupt ideal?" Williams, supra note 13, at 799. This view of bankruptcy 
as moral emptiness may account for at least some reluctance to participate in the bankruptcy 
process. 
135. In a sense, bankruptcy involves notions of breach of contract, the morality of which has 
evoked a rich literature. See C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Kronman, Paternalism 
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point are we willing to elevate the personal needs of debtors above the 
commercial needs and expectations of their creditors? Once we are 
within the realm of moral issues, we must address the possibility that 
women and men think about and handle moral dilemmas 
differently. 136 
My suggestion that men and women have different moral perspec-
tives has its roots in Carol Gilligan's now well-known work In a Dif-
ferent Voice 137 in which she concluded that boys and girls respond 
differently to moral problems. 138 Stated most simply, Gilligan con-
cluded that boys approach moral issues from a perspective of rational-
ity and impartiality (linear thinking), while girls view such issues from 
a perspective of caring, responsibility, and interconnectedness (rela-
tional thinking). In this and her later work, she goes on to suggest 
that while relational thinking may suggest dependency, it can also 
been seen as a source of empowerment.139 
An abundance of criticism has been directed at Gilligan's work. 140 
Some of these critics suggest that Gilligan's observations of difference 
are based on biological factors; others assert that ithey are based on 
societal factors. Still others believe Gilligan to be simply wrong. In-
and the Law of Contract, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); Rosenfeld, Contracts and Justice: The Rela-
tion Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. Rav. 769 (1985); 
Proceedings and Papers of the Conference on Contract Law: From Theory to Practice, 1988 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. (symposium issue on contract law). For an introductory discussion of the interre· 
lation between bankruptcy and contract, see Gross, supra note 40. 
136. At this juncture, I am suggesting that women may address moral issues differently from 
the way men do. I am not suggesting that women have, as yet, developed an entire moral philos· 
ophy distinct from existing moral philosophy. Such a theory may ultimately be developed but, at 
present, it appears to be only in the formative stages. See Baier, What Do Women Want in a 
Moral Theory, 19 NoOs 53 (1985). 
137. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 71. 
138. Gilligan's work is a response to the hierarchy of moral values established by Kohlberg. 
See 1 L. KOHLBERG, EssAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DE· 
VELOPMENT (1981); Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR (T. Lickona ed. 1976). Kohlberg's system 
of moral development generally placed girls lower on the scale than boys. This result was, ac-
cording to Gilligan, based on Kohlberg's sense of what was the morally "right" way to analyze 
moral problems. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 71, at 18-19. For a readable account of the differences 
between Gilligan and Kohlberg, see Blum, Gilligan and Koh/berg: Implications for Moral The· 
ory, 98 ETHICS 472 (1988). A more recent attempt to address these issues appears in MAPPING 
THE MORAL DOMAIN (C. Gilligan, J. Ward & J. Taylor eds. 1988). 
139. Gilligan states: "Being dependent, then, no longer means being helpless, powerless, and 
without control; rather, it signifies a conviction that one is able to have an effect on others, as well 
as the recognition that interdependence of attachment empowers both the self and the other, not 
one person at another's expense." Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self 
in Relationship, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN supra note 138, at 3, 16. 
140. Examples of this critical literature include E. SPELMAN, supra note 13; A Conversation, 
supra note 29; Greeno & Maccoby, How Different Is a Different Voice, 11 SIGNS 310 (1986); 
Scales, supra note 13; Sunstein, supra note 13; Walker, In a Diffident Voice: Cryptoseparatist 
Analysis of Female Moral Development, 50 Soc. REs. 665 (1983); Walker, Sex Differences in the 
Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review, 55 CHILD DEV. 677 (1984); West, supra 
note 13; Williams, supra note 13. 
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deed, Gilligan appears to have clarified her position in recent years, 141 
suggesting that not all girls think one way and all boys another, and 
that there is no single "right" way to address moral problems. She has 
also taken the view that the ethic of caring does not necessarily damn 
women to a life of subordination. 142 
Whatever. the criticism of Gilligan, I believe she has something sig-
nificant to say. It is what makes at least some of us more sympathetic 
to the feelings of the wife than to those of the husband in the Marti-
neau painting. Gilligan's work demonstrates first that there can in-
deed be a heterogeneity of views on issues of morality. Therefore, a 
legal (or indeed nonlegal)143 syste~ that assumes that a single perspec-
tive is the only legitimate perspective is misguided.144 Second, Gilli-
gan's work reveals that at least one part of that heterogeneity is 
comprised of the voices of women. The assumption that all women 
think as all men do is, as Gilligan observes, inaccurate. Not all men 
think alike, nor do all women. 
In the bankruptcy context, Gilligan's approach suggests - indeed 
implores - that we consider the possibility that we have formulated 
the bankruptcy system based on a one-gender (male) image of debt-
ors145 and with an unsophisticated approach to the moral dilemma 
confronting individuals who cannot repay their creditors. For certain 
debtors, particularly women, who are uncomfortable with the abrupt 
disruption of the debtor/creditor relationship, the liquidation ("screw 
you") option accorded by Chapter 7 of the Code may simply be un-
palatable, exacting a moral and psychological price too high to bear.146 
This may be particularly relevant when a debtor's creditors play an 
important role in the debtor's life - the doctor, local pharmacy, gro-
cer, cleaner, child-caretaker, and hardware store. These are not face-
less corporate creditors where personal interaction is irrelevant. 
What options are there, then, for such debtors? My more prag-
matic colleagues present the question this way: What are the conse-
quences of my suggestion that some people perceive the debtor/ 
creditor relationship differently from others? Am I suggesting an 
141. See supra note 138. 
142. See A Conversation, supra note 29, at 41-42; Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, 1 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM. 7 (1989). 
143. E.g., an economic, political, or social system. 
144. This seems to be what Martha Minow describes as stage-three feminist scholarship. See 
Minow, supra note 44, at 2-4. 
145. The absence of a single image of debtors is established at supra notes 26-31 and accom-
panying text. 
146. I think we also need to explore how, in a capitalistic and success-oriented society, men 
feel about their failures and whether the bankruptcy experience is for them a form of emascula-
tion. Barbara Weiss observes that at least in the Victorian literature, some men turned the expe-
rience of failure into an opportunity for rebirth. See B. WEISS, supra note 1. 
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overhaul of the entire bankruptcy system? Am I suggesting that we 
need a separate bankruptcy system for women? 
3. The Consequences of Difference 
The consequences that flow from differing images of debtors and 
their perspectives on debt and its extinguishment cover a broad spec-
trum. At one extreme, we could contemplate abolishing the fresh start 
altogether. This seems too dramatic and indeed unnecessary, unless 
we want to suggest that relief from indebtedness has no place at all 
within our bankruptcy system. Given the long and valuable historical 
and religious significance of the fresh start policy and the fact that 
some debtors can partake of the fresh start and benefit from it, it does 
not make sense to abandon it on a wholesale basis. 
Another possibility is to limit the applicability of the fresh start, a 
controversial approach that is currently being pursued through im-
plicit restrictions on access to Chapter 7147 and the encouragement of 
the use of Chapter 13.148 Applying the current statutory and judicial 
approach to differing debtor perspectives, we are left to encourage 
those debtors who are uncomfortable with the Chapter 7 "screw you" 
mentality to proceed under Chapter 13 and repay their creditors over 
time. Indeed, we currently reward the antipathy toward the "screw 
you" mentality by expanding the scope of the discharge in Chapter 13, 
a consequence with a degree of irony given that those utilizing Chap-
ter 13 may be uncomfortable with the idea of discharge in the first 
place.149 In sum, the reorganization as opposed to liquidation mode is 
more accommodating to those who want to continue their relation-
ships with creditors. 
This suggestion has some merit but there are several obstacles in 
the way of its success and several philosophical concerns about its ap-
plication. Encouraging reorganization as opposed to liquidation as-
sumes that reorganization cases generally succeed, a result that 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's research suggests is doubtful at 
best (pp. 214-17). It also assumes that those debtors desiring to use 
Chapter 13 will be eligible for its benefits. This also is problematic in 
that Chapter 13 is available to only those debtors with regular in-
come.1so Regular income requires that a debtor's, income be "suffi-
ciently stable" to make plan repayments.1s1 Many debtors, 
147. 11 u.s.c. § 707(b) (1988). 
148. See Gross, supra note 37; Gross, supra note 40. 
149. Moreover, this incentive works only if the debtor has nondischargeable debts in a Chap-
ter 7 proceeding that would be dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding. Another possible and 
perhaps more likely scenario is that the debtor is not affected by the expanded discharge - at 
least not to a significant degree. 
150. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). 
151. 11 u.s.c. § 101(29) (1988). 
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particularly single-filing women debtors, may not have stable income. 
They may not work regularly and their child support and alimony 
payments, while designed to be regular, are erratic. Although some 
courts have made an effort to construe this requirement broadly by, 
for example, indicating that Aid to Dependent Children payments 
constitute regular income, 152 there may be many debtors who prefer to 
proceed in a reorganization mode but are ineligible to do so.153 
Several other features of Chapter 13 limit its appeal. The reorgani-
zation plan is restricted to three years (five years under special circum-
stances), 154 which may not be long enough for certain debtors. If a 
debtor is willing to repay over more than three years, why shouldn't 
he or she be permitted to do so?155 Moreover, even if payments over 
this extended period were minimal, creditors might still get more than 
in a Chapter 7 proceeding or, at the least, no less. 156 Debtors making 
only minimal payments may well be operating in good faith. 157 Thus, 
an expanded Chapter 13 could make bankruptcy's fresh start more 
acceptable, at least from a psychological standpoint, with no net eco-
nomic loss to creditors. 
Encouraging increased use of current Chapter 13 or expanding ac-
cess to Chapter 13 itself is, however, very troubling from another per-
spective. If most single-filing women debtors were to opt for an 
expanded or more flexible Chapter 13, then a feminist perspective on 
bankruptcy, although morally and psychologically preferable, would 
lock women debtors into what might well be economically worse posi-
tions than men debtors who would be liquidating under Chapter 7. 
They become slaves to their creditors while men obtain freedom from 
their creditors.158 The debate about difference would, then, encourage 
152. See In re Hammonds, 729 F.2d 1391 (11th Cir. 1984). 
153. Pearce suggests, albeit in a different context, that unemployment benefits, which are 
perceived to be less socially stigmatized than welfare payments, do not help women. This is 
because these programs assume a male wage-earner who lost his job due to unfortunate circum-
stances. Women are frequently ineligible for such programs because they do not meet the thresh-
old entry requirements. That leaves women with the poverty programs designed for the 
"undeserving." Pearce, supra note 94, at 414; see also M. ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE 
LIVES OF WOMEN 291-98 (1988); Becker, supra note 122. 
154. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988). 
155. One possible objection, which I have raised in a different context, is that ifthe debtor is 
not freely choosing to work for this extended period (i.e., if the debtor is being coerced in some 
way), the result is something akin to peonage. See Gross, supra note 40. Moreover, we may have 
paternalistic concerns about debtors being tied into relationships with their creditors for too long 
a period before being able to begin anew. See Kronman, supra note 135. 
156. Chapter 13 requires that creditors get at least as much as they would get in a Chapter 7 
case. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988). Unfortunately, from my perspective, courts have objected 
to zero repayment plans, not because they fail under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988) but because 
they demonstrate a lack of good faith under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988). See infra notes 184-
88 and accompanying text. 
157. Indeed, there is a narrow definition of good faith which could be expanded to allow 
debtors to use a reorganization chapter in more circumstances. 
158. See Gross, supra note 40. 
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women to remain economically deprived while their creditors benefit-
ted and male debtors began afresh. Adapting the system to give 
greater weight to the ethos of caring and interrelationships would 
mean that women might not gain from our having heard and heeded 
their different voice; instead, they might be harmed. 159 
Given that predicament, several alternative approaches present 
themselves. First, we could encourage those debtors who are uncom-
fortable with the existing fresh start policy to overcome or rise above 
their discomfort. This solution, while diminishing the adverse impact 
of an expanded Chapter 13, would undermine the importance of differ-
ences. It would devalue caring and concern for interrelatedness. This 
alternative pursues homogeneity in a male image and hence is unac-
ceptable. It also places women debtors in a bind. Expanding Chapter 
13 to accommodate caring and interrelatedness perpetuates subordina-
tion and encourages more people to say "screw you" to creditors by 
filing for relief under Chapter 7, diminishing the import of caring and 
preserved relationships. 
This bind exists only if we consider too narrow a range of solu-
tions. Several "long-term" solutions exist. 160 We could seek systemic 
eradication of a social structure that leads to the impoverishment of 
women, that deprives them of the power men have. 161 We could con-
sider regulating creditors and the extension of credit so that materialis-
tic aspirations do not destroy people's lives. 162 We also could consider 
an alternative to the existing bankruptcy process - perhaps pursuing 
mediation rather than the existing adversarial process.163 
159. Joan Williams states: "More astonishing, difference feminists celebrate a women's cul· 
ture that encourages women to 'choose' economic marginalization and celebrate that choice as a 
badge of virtue. The notion that women 'choose' to become marginalized (nonideal) workers 
clouds the fact that all workers currently are limited to two unacceptable choices: the traditional 
male life pattern or women's traditional economic vulnerability. Wage labor does not have to be 
structured that way." Williams, supra note 13, at 801. 
160. Detailed analysis of these and other possible solutions will have to await another day. 
161. We would look, then, to empower women by increasing their ability to earn money, to 
recover alimony and child support from former spouses upon whom they had been dependent, to 
hold the same jobs as men, and to obtain adequate housing, health care benefits, insurance, and 
child care. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 29; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and 
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY, supra note 14, at 
135. 
162. See E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 40. This would entail reconsidering our 
credit system, the access individuals have to that system and the ways in which credit is pro-
moted. At an even more fundamental level, we, as a society, have to consider the level at which 
we want individuals to live and the level for which we want individuals to strive. 
163. This would arguably promote increased compromise by removing bankruptcy from the 
control of judges and permitting debtors to meet with their creditors face to face outside the 
courtroom. It would diminish the patriarchal overtones of a system dependent on judges rather 
than the parties themselves. This is not as dramatic a solution as some might suggest in that 
bankruptcy already encourages compromise, at least in the corporate context. See Curtin, Gross 
& Togut, Debtors-Out-Of-Control: A Look at Chapter ll's Check and Balance System, 1988 
ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 87. Counseling was also suggested by tlie Commission to study Bank-
ruptcy Reform in the late sixties and early seventies. See REPORT OF THE CoMMN. ON THE 
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Let me propose a shorter-term solution that can be stated very 
simply: we should attempt to humanize the bankruptcy process. The 
simplicity of this statement should not be taken to mean that the im-
plementation of the solution is simple or, for that matter, that the pro-
posal is simple-minded. Personal bankruptcy involves a broad range 
of human emotions. Owing money is, for many debtors, not just a 
matter of !follars and cents. Many debtors with financial problems are 
also experiencing very real personal problems - many, but not all, 
caused by their financial condition. These are problems that cannot be 
addressed in the bankruptcy system as presently configured. 
Consider the possibility of providing individual debtors with coun-
seling - both with respect to money management and other personal 
problems. 164 The absence of any social service input within the ex-
isting bankruptcy system is conspicuous.165 This suggestion would be 
a costly endeavor, and its efficacy hinges on both the availability and 
quality of social services for debtors and their families. 166 It also 
hinges on a willingness to expend limited governmental resources in 
this way. But, looked at long-term, we have to assess whether the cost 
of debtors to society as a whole under the current system, by virtue of 
debtors' inability to begin afresh, is higher than any alternative pro-
gram we might propose. 
There are other ways of humanizing the bankruptcy process. 
Debtors currently may not feel that they have a chance to tell their 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES at 11, 13, 122, reprinted in 2 A. REsNICK, BANK-
RUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY doc. 21. Moreover, it may prove less 
costly than the existing system.by cutting back on the use of the court system, with all of its 
related costs. 
Although the mediation option has been suggested by some feminists, it has not been univer-
sally endorsed. See Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal 
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Menkel-Meadow, Toward 
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. R:Ev. 754 
(1984); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71; Rifl<ln, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise 
and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984). 
164. One possibility is to consider conditioning discharge on a debtor's utilization of counsel-
ing services. 
165. Such an approach exists in other legal areas. We attempt to provide counseling to rape 
victims; we have begun to humanize the legal process that affects them, seeking to treat them as 
very real victims and not criminals. We seek substance abuse programs for drug and alcohol 
offenders and even some categories of other criminals. In som_e jurisdictions, mandatory counsel-
ing is a prerequisite to a decree of divorce; in other states counseling is mandatory in child 
custody matters. See Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future Considera-
tions, CoNCILIATION CTs. R:Ev., Dec. 1982, at 1, 18; Morris, Mandatory Custody Mediation: A 
Threat to Confidentiality, 26 SANTA CLARA L. R:Ev. 745 (1986). 
166. Ifwe think about possible funding sources, one immediately comes to mind. We could 
"tax" the consumer credit industry, which would have to contribute a certain dollar amount to a 
fund for the benefit of debtors every time a new credit card is issued. No doubt, this "tax" would 
be passed on to all credit card users through increased annual rates or interest charges. Then, we 
are balancing whether society is better served by these short-term cost outlays spread among the 
general population for the long-term goal of better utilization of credit (achieved through the 
counseling) or by letting debtors flounder in perpetuity, a cost also borne by society as a whole. 
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story - either in writing or orally - in their own voice.167 They may 
feel that the papers filed with the court do not adequately explain what 
has happened to them. Their story may just not fit within the little 
boxes on the official forms employed in bankruptcy cases. Moreover, 
in the one instance where debtors speak, namely the meeting of credi-
tors, 168 debtors are asked questions in the formal examination con-
ducted under oath and recorded. 169 This is hardly the time for a 
debtor to bare her soul. Indeed, with the streamlined procedure for 
handling individual cases, many debtors never personally appear in 
court or, if they do appear, their case is handled in a mass discharge 
proceeding where all debtors are treated alike. 170 
It is difficult to fathom implementing any of these suggestions ex-
cept at great cost and loss of efficiency. Our current bankruptcy sys-
tem depends, at least in theory, on quick resolution of the thousands of 
cases filed annually. For example, introducing a magistrate to hear 
the debtor is one possibility, but it would add yet another layer of 
administration to an already burdened system.171 Another possibility 
is to alert the U.S. Trustee's Office172 to these issues and encourage 
greater sensitivity among its personnel so that they could serve as a 
buffer between the debtor and the court. A third possibility is to en-
courage greater sensitivity on the bankruptcy bench to these issues. 173 
At a minimum, what my proposal seeks is to have people think 
differently about the bankruptcy process - to approach the resolution 
of debtors' financial and personal problems in a more interrelated and 
caring manner. My suggestions could cause an increase in filings by 
women debtors. This may trouble those already concerned about high 
167. Indeed, when debtors speak, they speak largely through counsel. See pp. 250-52. There 
is also the possibility that women debtors would feel more comfortable with women lawyers. As 
in other areas of private practice, the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy lawyers are male. 
See LoPucki, supra note 4, at 298. Additionally, women bankruptcy lawyers were more preva· 
lent in large firms, and such firms tend to do far less individual debtor work. Id.; see also Percep· 
tion and Reality, supra note 4, at 110. 
168. 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (1988). This meeting is colloquially known as the "341 meeting." 
169. For a detailed description of the 341 meeting and its related procedures, see J. BERK & 
S. JENSEN-CoNKLIN, supra note 50, at 56-57 & app. F. 
170. Section 524(d) of the Code provides that the court "may hold a hearing ..•• " 11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(d) (1988). Many courts have dispensed with the hearing altogether. See J, BERK & S. 
JENSEN-CoNKLIN, supra note 50, at 144. 
171. The federal district courts use this approach and it is worth investigating their experi-
ence with it. See, e.g .. Comment, Is the Federal Magistrate Act Constitutional After Northern 
Pipeline?, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 189. 
172. The U.S. Trustee program, implemented on a pilot basis in 1978 and on a virtually 
nationwide basis in 1984, is intended to oversee the administration of bankruptcy cases. The 
program was instituted so that bankruptcy judges could handle only adjudicated matters. There 
has been considerable debate concerning the efficacy of this program and the role of the trustees. 
See Perception and Reality, supra note 4, at 87-89, reprinted at 171-73; Curtin, Gross & Togut, 
supra note 165, at 93-94; Pearson, FitzSimon & Picard, Sed Qui Custodet Ipsos Custodes, in 
NATL. CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES, supra note 35, at 7-5. 
173. See Schafran, supra note 105, at 269-71. 
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filing rates. 174 Indeed, the system is already stressed by the continual 
influx of new bankruptcy cases.175 However, increasing filing rates for 
women debtors176 is already a concern; it suggests an increasing inabil-
ity of debtors generally to satisfy their creditors. Blaming increased 
filing rates on accessibility to bankruptcy relief seems to miss the 
point; we should focus on why people need such relief. 177 For women, 
the answer appears, at least in part, in As We Forgive Our Debtors. 
Women debtors, more than their male counterparts, are living on the 
edge of poverty. The bankruptcy system, while not the initial cause of 
the situation, is certainly in a position to attempt to break the cycle of 
poverty. 
C. During the Case 
As previously noted, a variety of issues affecting women debtors 
can arise during a bankruptcy case. 178 What happens during a case 
also is important to women who, although they have not filed them-
selves, are affected by the bankruptcy of someone close to them. These 
examples serve several functions. First, they demonstrate how a gen-
der-neutral statute adversely impacts on women. 179 They also suggest, 
although they do not irrebuttably prove, that women perceive debt 
and its discharge differently from their male counterparts, reinforcing 
the earlier discussion. 
Let me suggest four issues - two that affect filing women, one that 
affects nonfiling women, and one that can affect both.180 These issues 
174. See supra note 18. 
175. The government has projected 850,000 new filings by 1991, the vast majority of which 
will involve individual debtors. Szczebak, supra note 18. 
176. It must be remembered that, at present, we know little about how many women as 
opposed to men actually file. See supra note 74. 
177. See supra notes 75-78, 161-62 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text. 
179. For an analysis of the social security system from a feminist perspective, see Becker, 
supra note 122. 
180. There are several other examples that could have been used. First, § 522(a)(IO)(D) 
permits a debtor to exempt alimony, but only to the extent reasonably necessary for support. 11 
U.S.C. § 522(a)(IO)(D) (1988). Since it is primarily women who receive alimony, this provision 
permits bankruptcy courts to revisit decisions reached by family law courts; and women may, 
then, be deprived of income they found hard to get from former spouses. Section 523(a)(5) can 
lead to similar consequences. This section prohibits a debtor (the male debtor will usually be the 
one seeking discharge) from discharging alimony and child support. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) 
(1988). However, like§ 522(a)(IO)(D), a court can reevaluate whether what the debtor is paying 
is properly characterized as alimony and child support. If recharacterized as a property settle-
ment, the debtor's obligation is dischargeable, again creating a second bite at the apple - most 
frequently to the detriment of women debtors. (One can ask, though, whether the converse is 
true. Can a woman debtor object to a former spouse's discharge of a property settlement on the 
theory that it is really in the nature of alimony?) Another example of possible disparate impact 
involves § 522(f)(l) which permits a debtor to eliminate judicial liens that impair a debtor's 
exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l) (1988). In a divorce settlement, one spouse can obtain such a 
lien to preserve an interest in a homestead, to ensure that the other spouse does not sell the home 
free and clear. Since many debtors are male, the male debtor could use § 522(f)(l) to eliminate 
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are: (1) the application of section 1325(a)(3) in conjunction with sec-
tion 1325(b);181 (2) the questions asked in the Statement of Affairs re-
quired to be filed by the debtor under section 521(1); (3) the definition 
of "reasonable equivalent value" within section 548(a); and (4) the 
meaning of joint filings in section 302. 
On its face, the Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 13 plan 
can be confirmed if the requirements of sections 1325(a) and (b) are 
satisfied. 182 Section l325(b), which was added in 1984 as part of the 
consumer credit amendments, requires that where a debtor's plan does 
not provide for paying creditors in full (and creditors object), the 
debtor must allocate all of his disposable income to plan payments.183 
Section 1325(a)(3) provides that a plan must be proposed in good 
faith. 184 Recent cases have debated whether the Code permits zero 
payment plans under which debtors with no disposable income give 
their creditors nothing but still get the expanded Chapter 13 
discharge. 185 
Prior to 1984, these zero payment plans engendered considerable 
controversy,186 and although the 1984 amendments may have been in-
tended to eliminate them, one can make a very good argument that 
they, in fact, validated them. 187 The argument for eliminating these 
plans is that even if the debtor allocates all of his disposable income to 
plan payments, thereby satisfying section 1325(b), but has no disposa-
ble income, a zero payment plan does not constitute a plan proposed 
in good faith. Therefore, section 1325(a)(3) is not satisfied. Stated dif-
ferently, the issue is whether, assuming section 1325(b) is satisfied, a 
plan that contemplates paying nothing to one's creditors is one of the 
factors to be considered in determining good faith or is per se bad 
faith. 
If it is considered beneficial to expand the use of Chapter 13,188 
his former spouse's interest. All of these sections are deserving of further analysis to determine 
whether, in application, they have a disparate impact on women debtors. 
181. This topic was suggested by a student paper on zero repayment plans written by New 
York Law School student Raymond Selig. R. Selig, "Zero Plans": Still Alive and Well in Chap-
ter 13 (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
182. See generally Cornish & Herbert, The Debtor's Dilemma: Disposable Income as the Cost 
of Chapter 13 Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 47 LA. L. REV. 47 (1986); Gross, supra note 
37; Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 89; Note, 
The Effect of the Disposable Income Test Under Section 1325(b){l}(B) Upon the Good Faith In-
quiry of Section 1325(a)(3), 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 267 (1986). 
183. 11 u.s.c. § 1325(b) (1988). 
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988). 
185. See, e.g., Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987). 
186. Comment, supra note 49; Note, supra note 49; Note, Good Faith, Zero Plans, and the 
Purpose of Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13: A Legislative Solution to the Controversy, 61 B.U. L. 
R.Bv. 773 (1981). 
187. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ch. 1325 (15th ed. 1988); Comment, Section 1325(b) 
and Zero Payment Plans in Chapter 13, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 449 (1987). 
188. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text. 
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then debtors who comport with section 1325(b) by allocating all dis-
posable income to creditors - even if the amount is zero - should be 
deemed to satisfy the section 1325(a) good faith standard. This as-
sumes, of course, that there are no other factors such as fraud, misrep-
~esentation, or omission of financial data that would militate against 
confirmation.189 
Since many women debtors have little or no disposable income, 190 
the elimination of zero payment plans would have an adverse impact 
on them. These women debtors, who might be more comfortable 
within Chapter 13 and its more conciliatory approach (even where the 
net result is the same for creditors), will find themselves unable to ob-
tain a Chapter 13 discharge. This scenario is an example of the conse-
quences that can ensue when a facially gender-neutral statute is 
interpreted in a manner that affects debtors of one gender more 
particularly. 
The second example involves the Official Forms. Official Form 7, 
captioned Statement of Financial Affairs for Debtor Not Engaged in 
Business, must be filed by individual debtors pursuant to section 521 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.19 1 Debtors are asked to respond to a series 
of questions about their finances during the prior year. Completion of 
the statement presupposes the maintenance of good financial records. 
For example, the debtor is asked: "What payments in whole or in part 
have you made during the year immediately preceding filing of the 
original petition herein on any of the following: (1) loans; (2) install-
ment purchases of goods and services; and (3) other debts?" 192 
Response to this question posits that most debtors pay by personal 
check. However, I suspect that many poor debtors do not pay by 
check; I suspect many women debtors pay by cash and even if they did 
receive receipts for their payments, I doubt they retained those re-
ceipts over a period of a year. Just being asked the question is intimi-
dating to many debtors; their inability to prove what happened to 
them only reinforces their sense of inadequacy and failure. Indeed, a 
debtor can be denied a discharge for failing to keep and preserve 
records. 193 
The debtor is also asked: "Have you suffered any losses from fire, 
theft, or gambling during the year immediately preceding or since the 
189. There are factors other than the amount of repayment to creditors to be considered. See 
In re Okoreeh-Baah, 836 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Chaffin, 816 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAW. 1795 
(1983); Winters, Good Faith Under 1325(a)(3): Debtor's Choice or the Court's Dilemma?, 92 
COM. L.J. 95 (1987). 
190. As indicated supra at notes 75-76 and accompanying text, women debtors typically 
barely have enough to make ends meet. 
191. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1988); 11 U.S.C. app.-Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) (1988). 
192. 11 U.S.C. app.-Bankruptcy Rules, Official Form 7, ll(a) (1988). 
193. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (1988). 
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filing of the original petition herein?"194 The debtor is asked to supply 
names, dates, and places. Suppose a debtor is a compulsive gambler. 
Suppose the debtor's spouse (e.g., her husband with whom she is filing 
jointly) is a compulsive gambler. Is the debtor likely to admit either of 
these things? Indeed, being able to admit to compulsive gambling ac-
tivity presupposes that one is on the road to recovery. It also presup-
poses that a debtor in a joint case has no fear in disclosing something 
of this nature about a spouse. Moreover, how many gamblers, 
whether frequent or occasional, can remember exactly when, where, 
and how much they gambled? Most gamblers would also be unwilling 
to disclose the identity of their bookmakers. Yet the sanctions for fail-
ure to comply with the request for information are severe. A debtor 
can be denied a discharge for failing to explain satisfactorily any loss 
of assets. 195 
In some respects, I can see parallels between women debtors and 
the victims of rape. By making this parallel, I am not suggesting a 
woman's bankruptcy is equivalent - morally, legally, or emotionally 
- to rape. However, in both instances, a woman is, or at least may 
feel like, a victim and yet be treated by the "system" as if she were the 
wrongdoer. Moreover, what the "system" expects of women victims 
may not comport with what real victims would do. For example, the 
need to preserve evidence of a rape may not be sufficiently paramount 
on a victim's mind; she might want to wash away all traces of the rape 
by immediately bathing.196 To expect an impoverished, dependent, 
and overwhelmed woman to maintain detailed and complete financial 
records is similarly unrealistic. It is the product of a legal system that 
fails to recognize emotional realities. 
Moreover, the questions asked of debtors may make many women 
feel alienated. Their ingrained sense of powerlessness may render 
them less capable than their male counterparts to stand up to the addi-
tional stresses imposed on them, particularly if they have to deal with 
both their own sense of failure and fear of retribution from a spouse 
who may not favor personal disclosure of the sort demanded. Like 
rape victims who are reluctant to tell their Story, particularly to men, 
women debtors may be emotionally dissuaded from describing to com-
plete strangers their impoverishment, the struggle they encounter 
when they are abandoned emotionally and financially by men. Like 
rape victims, they may feel blamed for a situation for which they do 
not bear responsibility. 197 Indeed, women debtors often do not get a 
194. 11 U.S.C. app.-Bankruptcy Rules, Official Form 7, 14(a) (1988). 
195. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) (1988); see In re Dolin, 799 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1986) .. 
196. See c. ROBERTS, WOMEN AND RAPE 88 (1989). 
197. There is one further level of similarity. Rape victims are often accused of "causing" 
their own rape by dressing in a certain manner or acting toward a man in what is perceived as a 
provocative and inviting manner. Women debtors may be similarly accused in that they spent 
beyond their means, they accepted credit from creditors, they participated in their downfall. 
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chance to tell their story;198 they must have it written. The people 
doing that writing are, for the most part, their lawyers; and these law-
yers are predominantly men.199 
An example of a Code provision primarily involving nondebtor 
spouses involves judicial interpretation of fraudulent conveyance 
law.200 The prototypical fraudulent conveyance described in legal 
texts and treatises is the transfer by a debtor husband to his nondebtor 
wife of all major family assets. 201 On the theory that such a transfer 
either evinces actual intent to defraud the husband's creditors or is 
constructively fraudulent as against them,202 the transaction may be 
voided. 203 The transferred assets (other than those that are exempt 
under the Code) are then available to the husband's creditors. 
There has been remarkably little discussion of why such a transfer 
to a nonfiling spouse deceives creditors of the filing spouse or why that 
spouse, usually the wife, has not given "reasonable equivalent 
value."204 It is assumed that the receiving spouse (the wife) gave noth-
ing in return for the transfered assets because traditionally, little value, 
economic or otherwise, has been placed on a woman's work within the 
home.205 Recent studies have demonstrated that if a spouse's efforts at 
home were measured in purely economic terms (i.e., what it would 
cost to buy the services a wife normally performs "for free"), they 
would have a value of thousands of dollars annually. 206 Certainly, de-
This attitude toward women debtors treats creditors and society as blameless. It essentially pun-
ishes women for living in a culture that sanctions and perpetuates their powerlessness. 
198. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 167. 
200. Two Code sections deal with fraudulent conveyances: 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (1988). 
Section 544 draws state fraudulent conveyance law into a bankruptcy case. For a general over-
view of fraudulent conveyance law, see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 187, at chs. 544, 
548; R. GINSBERG, supra note 40. 
201. See R. AARON, supra note 40, at§ 10.07[1]; v. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 135 n.4 (1974); see also Pedlar, When Transfers Between Husband 
and Wife Are Fraudulent, FAM. ADvoc., Winter 1983, at 32. 
202. Under the new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, relatives are defined as insiders, and 
transfers to insiders reveal actual fraud. U.F.T.A. §§ 1(7)(i)(A), 4(b)(l) (1989). 
203. 11 u.s.c. § 550 (1988). 
204. See In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661 
(D. Del. 1969); Pedlar, supra note 203. 
205. See P. CHESLER & E. GOODMAN, supra note 119, at 207: "Women's work is not val-
ued. Our society honors what is paid for, which is not female labor." See also A. KESSLER-
HARRIS, supra note 77; D. RHODE, supra note 16, at 30-31; WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS: WO-
MEN'S CONSCIENCE (B. Anddolsen, C. Gudorf & M. Pellauer eds. 1985); see also Becker, supra 
note 122. 
206. In 1972, Chase Bank computed the value of a wife's work, considering all her tasks: 
nurse, cook, chauffeur, and the like. It came to $13,391.56 annually. However, the bank did not 
take into account other compensable activities of wives as teachers, secretaries, sexual and emo-
tional companions, or therapists, which would have increased the figure substantially. P. 
CHESLER & E. GOODMAN, supra note 119, at 98. Given inflation, other studies have placed the 
value of women's work within the home considerably higher. Granat, Couples: The High Price 
of Acrimony, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at D5, col. 1. 
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cades of marriage and the continuation of these services prospectively 
would seem to entitle a wife to an interest in her husband's property 
(particularly property that is used in the family home or the home 
itself) if her household work is valued. The wife "paid" for these 
items, even though she never received a paycheck and title does not 
appear in her name.201 
One final example is useful since it looks at the impact of the Bank-
ruptcy Code for filing and nonfiling women. Section 302 permits joint 
filing only by a husband and wife.208 This section fails to recognize 
that many women debtors have no spouse; they are the head of the 
household. 209 However, many of these women live with others with 
whom they have a shared financial relationship (daughters, mothers, 
lovers). This is a relationship which the bankruptcy law does not rec-
ognize, notwithstanding the growing literature on the changing nature 
of the American family.210 Section 302 fails, then, for being underin-
clusive. It also fails by presuming that husbands and wives share fi-
nancially, maintaining joint accounts and joint ownership of property 
and having joint creditors. This may simply not be true.211 Yet, the 
availability of the section with its procedural benefits and its frequent 
use212 suggest that lawyers and debtors alike assume women debtors 
will be better off filing jointly with their spouses. That presumption is 
one that merits further consideration. 
The various examples of the treatment of women during a case 
suggest that we have some hard thinking to do about whether we emo-
tionally perceive debtors as villains or victims. Our bankruptcy sys-
tem sends a mixed message: come and get a discharge (be a villain, say 
"screw you" to your creditors), but be prepared, particularly if you are 
a woman, to feel humiliated, inadequate, dependent while you are do-
ing so (i.e., be a victim). This does not occur because of anything in-
tentional on the part of legislators enacting the Code or the 
participants in the bankruptcy process. However, our unconscious as-
sumptions and motives often are more powerful than what we actually 
say. 
207. Some state laws accomplish this result through community property laws or other laws 
entitling spouses to ownership interests in property acquired during the marriage. See W. MC-
CLANAHAN, CoMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); Wadington, Uni-
form Marital Property Act Symposium, 21 Haus. L. REv. 595 (1984); see also J. DUKEMINIER & 
J. KRIER, PROPERTY 351-58 (2d ed. 1988). However, community property notions are not the 
be-all, end-all for women debtors. 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); see supra note 58. 
209. See supra note 58. 
210. See supra note 58. 
211. See Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes 
Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 380-82 (1990). 
212. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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D. After the Case 
I have already suggested that a legal fresh start is not enough for 
debtors.213 A fresh start requires an emotional component as well as a 
real sense that there is some possibility of rebuilding. I suspect that 
many women debtors cannot get a fresh start at any of these three 
levels, although perhaps empirical data will prove me wrong. First, as 
already noted, many debtors do not list all their debts.214 Unlisted 
debts cannot be discharged. 215 Moreover, many debtors reaffirm their 
debts (pp. 32, 319), even with the increased standards for reaffirmation 
added in 1984.216 Reaffirmation means that a debtor's future is en-
cumbered. One can only wonder how many debtors voluntarily agree 
to repay their creditors, particularly creditors with whom they have 
frequent contact and emotional ties.217 Certainly, empirical work 
looking at whether men and women debtors reaffirm (formally and 
informally) at the same rate would prove useful. 
The ability to handle a fresh start emotionally may be particularly 
difficult for women debtors.218 We do not have statistics on whether 
women are using Chapter 13 more frequently than Chapter 7, just be-
cause of discomfort with the "screw you" posture inherent in Chapter 
7. However, by far the more critical issue to me is the realization that 
many women in debt will not be helped by a bankruptcy discharge. 
Relieving themselves of the immediate pressures of debt payments and 
impending lawsuits may ease their stress, but it may be a temporary 
palliative at best. Many women will continue to remain poor. They 
will not have equal access to the same educational and vocational op-
portunities available to men. Instead, they will continue to have sig-
nificant financial, emotional, and temporal responsibilities for their 
children and, increasingly, their parents.2 19 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's data underscore the reality of 
women's povertization. The cure cannot be found in the bankruptcy 
system. But, bankruptcy appears to be more than a mirror. In addi-
tion to providing us with a vision of what is happening outside of 
bankruptcy, bankruptcy perpetuates that vision by operating in a man-
ner that reinforces women's poverty. The Bankruptcy Code, as a 
phallocentric creation, perpetuates rather than resolves the feminiza-
tion of poverty. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15. 
214. See supra note 68. 
215. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (1988). 
216. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (1988); see also Boshkoff, supra note 114. 
217. 11 u.s.c. § 524(9) (1988). 
218. See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text. 
219. Lewin, Aging Parents: Women's Burden Grows, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 
4; Mothers Bearing a Second Burden, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, at A26, col. 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
With their data, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook have laid out 
the issues, inviting the rest of us to take up where they left off. This 
essay has attempted, first, to suggest the significance of getting the 
data. The portrait of debtors and their creditors in 1981 provides an 
invaluable starting point. There was no real starting point before. 
Now we can discard our stereotypes and begin the process of really 
seeing. Re-vision can only begin by looking with fresh eyes. I have 
suggested, however, that the job of discovering our debtors is not com-
plete. Debtors today may not look like the debtors of 1981, and there 
js a great deal of data yet to be uncovered. 
We also need to expand the scope of our empirical inquiry. We 
need to look at those who are not official debtors but who experience 
the bankruptcy process nonetheless, namely, the spouses, ex-spouses, 
lovers, companions, and children of debtors. These people are impor-
tant but as yet unstudied participants in bankruptcy. Most impor-
tantly, in addition to objective, quantitative data drawn from case files 
and analysis of debtors before and after filing, we need subjective, 
qualitative perceptual data; we need to consider how debtors, particu-
larly women debtors, feel. Without addressing the emotive side of 
bankruptcy, we fail to understand its complexity. We fail to give 
bankruptcy its moral dimension. 
I have also tried to establish a framework for thinking about issues 
in bankruptcy from a feminist perspective. Indeed, I have attempted 
to use a feminist methodology throughout this essay, both in evaluat-
ing the data presented in As We Forgive Our Debtors and in articulat-
ing an agenda for thinking about the bankruptcy system. This 
feminist perspective permits us to recognize more fully the heterogene-
ity among debtors and to identify the consequences of that diversity. 
A feminist perspective requires that we focus on women debtors and 
their experiences before, during, and after a bankruptcy case; it also 
suggests that we have had a singularly narrow, male-oriented ap-
proach to bankruptcy issues. It is time to expand our horizons. But 
the feminist perspective enables us to recognize, above all else, that 
bankruptcy is a symptomatic expression of and contributor to a much 
larger problem for women debtors, namely, povertization. 
This essay began with a painting, an image of a Victorian family in 
debt. I would like to end with my painting of the family in debt today. 
This painting can serve as a way of experiencing visually what has 
been said in this essay. It is also intended to set out the parameters of 
the issues I plan to address in the future. It sets my table and hope-
fully invokes others to join me. It is my re-vision. 
I want to start by stating that my painting is not complete. That is 
its first feature. It is incomplete because we still do not know a great 
deal about individual debtors. I am not sure a painting like this can 
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ever be finished. It also does not contain images of creditors, and they 
form an essential part of bankruptcy imagery. Further, my painting 
cannot be painted on a single panel because there is no one image of 
the debtor family. Any single image would leave out too much. So I 
am painting a triptych - a series of three panels that together com-
prise one painting.220 My painting style is realism but with overtones 
of surrealism; there is intensive attention to detail, to things and 
people. 
One panel would show a woman debtor with several children. No 
man would be present; there is a surreal image of a man at play in an 
upper comer. The mother and children would not live in a seeming 
mansion, as depicted by Martineau. They would be living in a run-
down neighborhood in a tiny, sparsely furnished apartment. They 
would not be dressed in elegant clothes; they would be dressed for 
work and school. The closets would not contain a lot of clothes. The 
kitchen pantry would not be well-stocked. The mother would look 
tired and emotionally drained. She would appear to be stretched thin 
- tom between her responsibilities for work and family. There would 
be no glass uplifted to toast the future. The background would be grey 
and foreboding. 
The next panel would depict a husband and wife and their chil-
dren. They would be outside their small home, looking at it. An ag-
ing car would be parked in the driveway. The couple would not be 
holding hands. The mailbox would be filled with bills, together with 
offers oft new credit cards and installment sales promotions. The hus-
band would be dressed in a tie and jacket, ready for work. The wife 
would be dressed in a housecoat. The children would be playing on 
the grass, more or less oblivious to what may happen to them. One 
child looks sickly. The father looks worried but resolved; the wife 
looks tired and forlorn. 
A third panel would depict a man. He is outside the family home. 
He is returning home from work, holding what appears to be a pink 
slip. He is anxious and weary. Through a window, one can see his 
mother, wife, and daughter seated around the kitchen table. They are 
talking together about their lives, their problems, their concerns. The 
kitchen appliances appear old and worn; they need replacement. The 
house needs painting. But there is food on the stove. There is sewing 
in a comer. There are magazines piled up, magazines depicting a 
much richer and easier life. There is stationary and a pen with a stack 
of envelopes at one end of the table, suggesting that the wife is trying 
to contact creditors, to connect with them and explain the family 
220. It would have been possible, and fully consistent with this essay, to paint three different 
panels, depicting debtors before, during, and after the bankruptcy case. I have tried, however, to 
combine aspects of the "before, during, and after" approach within each of my panels. 
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problems. The late afternoon sunlight angles sharply through the 
window. 
In each panel, I would hide little images of the devil to raise the 
moral concerns individuals may feel about debt and that we, as a soci-
ety, may feel. The viewer would have to search for them. I would also 
hide religious symbols throughout the painting, wondering what role 
religion plays in our perceptions of debt. Additionally, hidden in each 
painting would be the sun with a smirking, sinister-like social expres-
sion, suggesting the deceptive nature of the fresh start bankruptcy al-
legedly provides. Some of the walls of the homes would have 
portraits, as a way of reminding us of our past. 
The triptych would also have images of the bankruptcy process 
that is impending. The first panel would contain, above the image of 
the debtor, an authoritarian man behind a desk with several other men 
with papers at their sides. They would all have their fingers raised, as 
if scolding the woman in the painting. The second panel would reveal, 
below the painting of the debtors, an overheated, dark cavern filled 
with papers and little gnomes rushing forward and backward. Dodg-
ing the gnomes, there would be people with sunken faces and hollow 
eyes who appear lost. Finally, the third panel would contain, off to the 
side, an image of two women, each clambering on opposites of a 
heavy, carved wooden door - one woman seeking to get in, the other 
to get out. 
The combined tableau would overwhelm a viewer with its density 
of detail; some of the panels would seem too crowded. But there 
would be richness, and a sense of our world with all of its complexity, 
its ordinariness, and its ugliness brought to the foreground. It is a 
tableau to make us reckon with the world as it is, to sort out life's 
pieces, to confront our manyness. It is a tableau that may enrage, but 
that anger may help us see debtors differently and search for solutions 
to make the bankruptcy system better for all debtors. It is a feminist 
painting. 
